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A CORPORATE OFFSHORE PROFITS
TRANSITION TAX*
SUSAN C. MORSE"
Congress might repeal the residual U.S. tax imposed when non-
U.S. subsidiaries repatriate earnings to U.S. parent corporations.
Repeal would raise the transition issue of how to tax the $1 trillion
to $2 trillion of offshore earnings held by such non-U.S.
subsidiaries. This Article proposes a 5-10% corporate offshore
profits transition tax on non-U.S. subsidiaries' untaxed earnings
and profits, without downward adjustment for a foreign tax credit.
It suggests using the financial accounting measure of unremitted
earnings to help determine pre-1987 earnings and police
aggressive efforts to reduce the earnings and profits base. The
Article's comprehensive policy analysis is based on the metrics of
efficiency, administrability, and equity.
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What should happen to the $1 trillion to $2 trillion of untaxed
earnings held offshore in the non-U.S. subsidiaries of U.S.-parented
multinational corporations ("MNCs") in the event of corporate
income tax reform?'
Current U.S. rules are vulnerable to aggressive international tax
planning2 and encourage U.S.-parented MNCs to retain cash offshore
in non-U.S. subsidiaries to avoid the residual U.S. income tax
imposed, subject to foreign tax credits, on dividends repatriated to
U.S. parents.' A territoriality reform might address the situation by
exempting non-U.S. business income from U.S. tax and attempting to
carefully define non-U.S. income in order to protect the U.S. tax
base.4 A worldwide consolidation reform would try to solve the
1. See DAVID ZION, AMIT VARSHNEY & NICHOLE BURNAP, CREDIT SUISSE,
PARKING EARNINGS OVERSEAS 1 (2011) (giving a $1.3 trillion estimate for the related,
though distinct, financial accounting figure of permanently reinvested earnings).
2. See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Worse Than
Exemption, 59 EMORY L.J. 79, 85 (2009) (summarizing argument that the imperfections of
various U.S. international tax rules produce a system that is even more favorable to U.S.-
parented MNCs than territoriality); Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX
REV. 699, 707-14 (2011) (arguing that the U.S. international corporate income tax system
is an "ersatz territorial" system).
3. See Daniel Shaviro, The Rising Tax-Electivity of U.S. Corporate Residence, 64 TAX
L. REV. 377, 406 (2011).
4. See Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Evaluating International Tax Reform, 56
NAT'L TAX J. 487, 494 (2003). One approach argues that worldwide efficiency concerns,
under the theory of capital ownership neutrality, support territoriality. Id. ("The United
States would reduce world welfare by taxing foreign income .. .since such a system
encourages American firms to purchase assets in high-tax countries and foreign firms to
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problems by including in U.S. MNCs' corporate income tax base all of
the income earned by non-U.S. subsidiaries of a U.S.-parented MNC,
with a deduction or a credit for foreign income taxes paid.'
Intermediate reform options include the taxation of non-U.S.
business income at a rate less than the maximum U.S. rate, but more
than zero.6
Reform proposals often include the repeal of the existing U.S.
"residual" tax upon the repatriation of profits to U.S. parents.' This
raises the question considered here:" What transition tax, if any,
should be imposed on pre-enactment offshore earnings upon the
repeal of the residual repatriation tax?
Such a transition tax might be called a corporate offshore profits
transition tax. This Article considers the proper design of such a
transition tax designed as a lump-sum tax that would fully satisfy
purchase assets in low-tax countries."); see also infra Part LA (describing different
arguments in favor of territoriality). See generally Harry Grubert & Rosanne Altshuler,
Corporate Taxes in the World Economy: Reforming the Taxation of Cross-Border Income,
in FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM: ISSUES, CHOICES, AND IMPLICATIONS 319, 329-30
(John W. Diamond & George R. Zodrow eds., 2008) (describing territoriality and
"constant burden worldwide taxation").
5. Capital export neutrality is a worldwide efficiency-based theory sometimes
invoked in support of worldwide consolidation. See OFFICE OF TAX PoICY, DEP'T OF
THE TREASURY, THE DEFERRAL OF INCOME EARNED THROUGH U.S. CONTROLLED
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS 26-42 (2000) (summarizing capital export neutrality-based
literature).
6. See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 3, at 417 (proposing "serious consideration" of a low
but nonzero rate of tax on non-U.S. income). Worldwide efficiency standards support
either zero taxation of non-U.S. income (in the case of CON) or full taxation of non-U.S.
income (in the case of CEN). However, national welfare standards may well be more
appropriate benchmarks for the consideration of the domestic policy question of
international corporate tax reform. A national welfare standard can support the taxation
of non-U.S. business income at a rate between zero and the domestic rate, for example, in
order to calibrate the rate to reflect the appropriate level of encouragement for U.S.-based
businesses to invest outside the U.S. See Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income:
Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV.
261, 280-82 (2001) (supporting national welfare, rather than worldwide efficiency, as a
policy goal); Daniel Shaviro, Why Worldwide Welfare as a Normative Standard in U.S. Tax
Policy?, 60 TAX L. REV. 155, 164-65 (2007) (contending that, even if worldwide welfare
improves national welfare by encouraging cooperative behavior, unobserved defections
should improve national welfare).
7. However, the Obama administration's "framework" is vague on this point. See
generally WHITE HOUSE & DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT'S FRAMEWORK
FOR BUSINESS TAX REFORM (2012), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/
Documents/The-Presidents-Framework-for-Business-Tax-Reform-02-22-2012.pdf (not
specifying a repatriation policy).
8. This question has not been comprehensively analyzed, although Daniel Shaviro
has given an outline defense of a transition tax at a rate of approximately twenty percent.
See Shaviro, supra note 3, at 417-28 (analogizing to transition issue upon the adoption of
corporate integration).
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MNCs' U.S. income tax obligations with respect to pre-enactment
untaxed earnings of non-U.S. subsidiaries. An MNC's payment of
such a tax would permit the tax-free repatriation of such pre-
enactment earnings after enactment.9
Several factors initially constrain the design of a corporate
offshore profits transition tax. One is the political environment, which
appears to favor a territorial reform (if any reform at all)"o and thus
poses the question of how to design the transition tax in conjunction
with territoriality. Constitutional boundaries based on a substantive
due process analysis likely rule out an exact and explicit retroactive
taxation approach." Tax treaties present a third constraint: the
imposition of a corporate offshore profits transition tax might
generate a tax treaty controversy if an MNC could submit a credible
claim that the transition tax should reduce taxes due to a treaty
partner. 12
Within these design constraints, there is a considerable range of
choices for the design of the transition tax. In particular, the
constraints permit a range of tax rates and tax bases. Both the tax rate
question and the tax base question pose considerations of efficiency,
administrability, and equity.
Taxpayer expectations are the key to the efficiency analysis of
the appropriate transition tax rate presented in this Article. In
particular, this Article takes the view that the transition tax should
seek to match taxpayer expectations. This view is based on an
assumption that legislators would prefer to avoid an abrupt departure
from taxpayer expectations. Legislators would presumably worry that
departing from taxpayer expectations would cause corporate
taxpayers to take undesirable actions after the enactment of the law.
For example, taxpayers might overinvest in handicapping future
transition tax policy or use expatriation strategies to change to non-
9. See infra Part II.A.
10. See, e.g., MARTIN SULLIVAN, CORPORATE TAX REFORM: TAXING PROFITS IN
THE 21ST CENTURY 83 (2011).
11. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 35 (1994) (applying rational basis test
and upholding one-year retroactivity for limitation of estate tax deduction for proceeds of
sale of stock to employee stock ownership plan); id. at 38 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("A
period of retroactivity longer than the year preceding the legislative session in which the
law was enacted would raise, in my view, serious constitutional questions.").
12. A number of U.S. treaty partners have tax systems that include foreign tax credit
provisions, even though their systems may also be territorial. See HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN
J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 448-64 (3d
ed. 2010). Frequently, the types of taxes that are creditable are listed in treaties. See id. at
452.
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U.S.-parented corporate structures in an effort to avoid similar
adverse congressional action in the future.
There are at least three possible sources of taxpayer expectations
about a likely transition tax. First, taxpayers may rely on information
about transition tax policy, including information about other
countries' transition taxes upon the adoption of territoriality. Second,
they may analyze the issue under the assumption that Congress will
seek to match transition tax burdens to the present value of the
expected future burden of taxation of offshore earnings. Third, they
may be unwilling or unable to perform the exercise of absorbing
and/or acting on information about possible transition tax policy,
resulting in a tax burden they expect to be, as in the second analytical
approach, formed by existing law. This Article analyzes each of these
factors and argues that they support a congressional proposal of a
corporate offshore profits transition tax rate of between 5% and 10%,
with no allowance for foreign tax credits ("FTCs").
Administrability concerns support a transition tax rate that is
uniform across all companies. But a uniform transition tax rate raises
equity considerations." One question concerns the horizontal equity
relationship between different business groups with interests in the
current tax reform debate. A corporate offshore profits transition tax
would burden global incorporated businesses owned by a U.S. parent
corporation, but this might offset benefits provided by territoriality
reform to global multinationals relative to current law, depending on
the details of the reform. 14 Another question involves the relative
equities of different groups of global multinationals, such as groups
with higher FTCs and groups with lower FTCs. Since different groups
13. For purposes of this Article, equity considerations relating to the proper place of
the corporate income tax in the U.S. system are set aside. One view holds that it is
reasonable to assume that the corporate income tax largely falls on shareholders, and
therefore the corporate tax is an important progressive element of the U.S. tax system. See
J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Fairness in International
Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 299,
322-23 (2001) (arguing that the ability-to-pay feature of the U.S. federal income tax
supports taxing corporations on their worldwide income). Related arguments defend the
corporate tax from a regulatory perspective. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193,
1196 (2004). Both of these views may support a higher corporate offshore profits transition
tax rate simply because the transition tax would be a corporate tax.
14. See, e.g., Harry Grubert, Enacting Dividend Exemption and Tax Revenue, 54
NAT'L TAX J. 811, 819-23 (2001) (emphasizing the importance of expense allocation
including interest expense allocation and the incentives for shifting repatriation structures
from royalties to dividends under a territorial system); see also Michael Graetz & Paul
Oosterhuis, Structuring an Exemption System for Foreign Income of U.S. Corporations, 54
NAT'L TAX J. 771, 774 (2001) (listing design options for defining business income).
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of global multinationals are able to redress perceived inequities
through the legislative process, including through adjustments to a tax
reform package separate from the transition tax, transition tax
liability does not necessarily need to reflect downward adjustments to
account for FrCs.
The question of the proper transition tax base may also be
analyzed from efficiency, administrability, and equity perspectives.
One possible transition tax base is a tax measure-the untaxed
offshore "earnings and profits" of U.S. MNCs."5 Another candidate is
a financial accounting measure of unremitted earnings, including, but
not limited to, any earnings designated as permanently reinvested
earnings.
The earnings and profits base meets taxpayer expectations, thus
furthering efficiency and, arguably, equity goals. But firms lack
readily available records for all of their earnings and profits,
particularly pre-1987 earnings and profits. Additionally, firms would
have a tax incentive to reduce earnings and profits. Thus, the earnings
and profits tax base raises efficiency, administrability, and horizontal
equity challenges.
An unremitted earnings tax base has efficiency and
administrability benefits, as it would likely facilitate the calculation of
pre-1987 earnings and might check firms' ability or desire to engage
in planning to reduce the tax base. It would, however, deviate from
taxpayer expectations, presenting an efficiency problem. An equity
analysis also reveals drawbacks in the use of an unremitted earnings
tax base. In particular, to the extent that the distribution of
unremitted earnings among firms differs from the distribution of
earnings and profits among firms, taxing the financial accounting-
derived tax base would allocate the tax burden in a way that is
different from the way in which the tax burden would be allocated if
the tax measure were used.
Policymakers might seek to claim some of the administrability
and efficiency advantages of an unremitted earnings tax base while
avoiding the taxpayer expectation efficiency problem and the equity
question raised by exclusive reliance on an unremitted earnings base.
For example, the law might give permission for firms to use an
unremitted earnings measure to estimate their pre-1987 earnings and
profits. It could also require disclosure of the gap between a firm's
15. Shaviro, supra note 3, at 426 (describing a tax base consisting of "controlled
foreign subsidiaries' accumulated earnings and profits ... under U.S. rules, through the
effective date").
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offshore earnings and profits and a firm's book-tax basis difference
for its non-U.S. subsidiaries and the reasons for such a gap. Such a
disclosure would parallel the existing Schedule M-3, which is a book-
tax income reconciliation required of large firms."
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the political,
constitutional, and tax treaty constraints that frame the consideration
of a corporate offshore profits transition tax on untaxed offshore
earnings in conjunction with the enactment of a territorial corporate
income tax reform. Part II considers efficiency, administrability, and
equity concerns that influence the choice of the transition tax rate.
Part III evaluates efficiency, administrability, and equity factors in
connection with the choice of the transition tax base. Part IV
discusses the alternative prospect of worldwide consolidation reform
and the prospect of a transition tax in connection with such a reform.
I. POLITICAL, CONSTITUTIONAL, AND TAX TREATY CONSTRAINTS
A. Politics of Corporate Tax Reform
The politics of corporate income tax reform do not favor
change." The U.S. legislative process presents many sequential
hurdles to enactment and therefore favors the status quo. 8 In the
corporate tax reform area, Jennifer Arlen and Deborah Weiss argue
that agency costs further hamper reform because managers favor
policies like accelerated depreciation that provide targeted incentives
for new corporate investment, even though shareholders prefer
policies that also enrich existing investment.19 Michael Doran builds
on the Arlen and Weiss analysis with a public choice account of
heterogeneity of interests among different corporations.20 The result,
16. Schedule M-3 (Form 1120), Net Income (Loss) Reconciliation for Corporations
with Total Assets of $10 Million or More, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/
f1120sm3.pdf.
17. See SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 3-10 (explaining the influence of interest groups
and other concerns making reform unlikely).
18. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH
GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 70 (2d ed. 2006) ("The
most salient aspect of the modem legislative process is that it is filled with a complex set of
hurdles that proponents of a new policy must overcome before their bill becomes law.").
19. See Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate
Taxation, 105 YALE L.J. 325, 336-38 (1995) (arguing that managers have incentives to
favor policies that encourage additional investment or otherwise make possible increases
to individual returns such as salaries).
20. See Michael Doran, Managers, Shareholders and the Corporate Double Tax, 95
VA. L. REV. 517, 536-42 (2009) (citing "unevenness resulting from the different use of
corporate tax preferences, interest deductions, and tax shelters").
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he argues, is an incentive for corporations that disproportionately
benefit from a certain tax break, for example, the research and
development credit, to lobby energetically to keep that tax break
rather than supporting more general reform proposals like base-
broadening and rate-lowering."
If corporate tax reform does make it to the legislative agenda
sometime in the relatively near future, the international aspect of a
package may include territoriality, the exemption of non-U.S.
business income earned by corporations (including U.S.-parented
MNCs) from U.S. income tax.22 This departs from the worldwide
efficiency idea of capital export neutrality, or "CEN,"2 3 which has
strongly influenced thinking about international tax policy within
government 24 since at least the Kennedy administration. CEN is
strongest if the critical question for the proper allocation of
investment is the decision about the allocation of U.S. capital among
various investments with flexible location.2 6 CEN supports a system
of worldwide residence-based taxation, including a system of
worldwide consolidation for corporate income taxation.2 7 Numerous
scholars have advocated a policy of worldwide consolidation, relying
on the theory of CEN to varying degrees."
21. Id.
22. See JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, MOVING TO A
TERRITORIAL INCOME TAX: OPTIONS AND CHALLENGES 1-3 (2012) (describing tax
reform landscape including territoriality proposals).
23. Peggy Musgrave first articulated the idea of CEN within a worldwide efficiency
framework and outlined other approaches to efficiency and international taxation. See
generally PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, UNITED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
INCOME: ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS (1969). A more extreme view related to CEN is
national neutrality, which prescribes a deduction, rather than a credit, for foreign income
taxes. See Peggy B. Musgrave, Combining Fiscal Sovereignty and Coordination: National
Taxation in a Globalizing World, in THE NEW PUBLIC FINANCE: RESPONDING TO
GLOBAL CHALLENGES 167, 178 (Inge Kaul & Pedro Conceiglo eds., 2006) ("[Uinder
what may be called a 'national' view of taxpayer equity the foreign tax is treated as a
deduction from foreign source income (in effect, a cost of doing business), and the
residence country's corporate tax is applied to foreign earnings net of foreign tax.").
24. For example, Treasury reports have emphasized CEN. See OFFICE OF TAX
POLICY, supra note 5, at 34 (summarizing capital export neutrality-based literature).
25. Subpart F grew out of a worldwide consolidation proposal made by the Kennedy
administration. See Special Message to the Congress on Taxation, 1961 PUB. PAPERS 290,
294 (Apr. 20, 1961) (proposing "[ellimination of tax deferral privileges in developed
countries and 'tax haven' deferral privileges in all countries").
26. See Jane G. Gravelle, International Corporate Tax Reform: Issues and Proposals, 9
FLA. TAX REV. 469,479-81 (2009) (arguing that CEN trumps CON if capital is mobile).
27. See Wolfgang Schan, International Tax Coordination for a Second-Best World, 1
WORLD TAX J. 67, 78 (2009).
28. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A
Proposal for Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1329-30 (1996) (describing tax planning
556 [Vol. 91
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For some time, the international corporate tax reform battle lines
were drawn between, on one hand, CEN and worldwide
consolidation and, on the other hand, capital import neutrality
("CIN") or capital ownership neutrality ("CON") and territoriality.29
CON, the more current worldwide efficiency theory invoked in favor
of territoriality, assumes that the critical investment allocation
question is the asset owner's identity.3 0 CON focuses on minimizing
the likelihood that a capital asset will attract the wrong owner based
on tax policy. 3' CON supports territoriality because territoriality will
result in the same tax, and therefore the same after-tax return, on the
profits generated by a capital asset located in a particular jurisdiction
regardless of the asset's owner.32 The idea is that if the after-tax
return is the same regardless of the asset's owner, then the owner who
can make the most productive use of the asset will own it. CON is
most persuasive when applied to geographically fixed assets.
problem with territoriality); Fleming, Peroni & Shay, supra note 13, at 322-23; Edward D.
Kleinbard, The Lessons of Stateless Income, 65 TAX L. REV. 99, 152-55 (2011) (listing
advantages of worldwide consolidation, including: (1) satisfying CEN; (2) solving the
problem of "stateless income"; and (3) finessing the "otherwise intractable" problems of
transfer pricing and expense allocation).
29. See Michael S. Knoll, Reconsidering International Tax Neutrality, 64 TAX L. REV.
99, 100-03 (2011) (describing the traditional understanding of CEN/CIN tension).
30. See Desai & Hines, supra note 4, at 494 ("The United States would reduce world
welfare by taxing foreign income ... since such a system encourages American firms to
purchase assets in high-tax countries and foreign firms to purchase assets in low-tax
countries."). The older concept of capital import neutrality, or CIN, also supports
territoriality. It can be understood to incorporate two neutrality concepts, relating to
ownership and to savings versus investment. CON continues to encompass the ownership
neutrality component. See Knoll, supra note 29, at 119-21. However, the CIN idea that
different tax rates imposed on different investors will distort savings and investment rates
is not consistent with empirical work demonstrating that savings rates are not very
sensitive to tax policy. See Schon, supra note 27, at 78. However, CIN's ownership
neutrality component survives in the form of CON.
31. See Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Old Rules and New Realities: Corporate
Tax Policy in a Global Setting, 57 NAT'L TAX J. 937, 956 (2004) ("Global efficiency is
characterized by ownership arrangements that maximize total world output, whereas
national welfare (taking the tax policies of other countries as given) is characterized by tax
policies that maximize home country incomes.").
32. CON is satisfied if all nations have territorial systems. Its main policy directive is
that, since most U.S. trading partners have territorial systems, the U.S. should also adopt
such a system. However, CON is also consistent with all nations' adoption of worldwide
residence-based taxation with full foreign tax credits, even if nations have different tax
rates, so long as the relationship between the tax rates is fixed. The reason is that capital
owners resident in any jurisdiction will face the same after-tax return on all of their
investments, so their investment choices will not be distorted by taxes. See Desai & Hines,
supra note 4, at 494-95.
33. See id. at 495 ("The welfare implications of CON are less decisive in settings in
which the location of plant, equipment, and other productive factors is mobile between
countries....").
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The CEN/CON framework does not attract a consensus. Critics
of the CEN/CON debate, including Michael Graetz and Daniel
Shaviro, charge that worldwide efficiency is not the right metric to
evaluate a tax system.3 4 In a separate article, Shaviro criticizes the
binary full-or-zero-taxation approach presented by the CEN/CON
debate and proposes "serious consideration" of a low, but non-zero,
rate of U.S. tax on foreign income." Johannes Becker and Clemens
Fuest argue that CON has failed to identify a satisfying welfare
function. 6 David Hasen contends that the debate omits the important
role of tax revenues in providing productivity-enhancing "tax
amenities," such as infrastructure, and proposes explicit consideration
of the "competitive, allocative, and distributional properties of
various possible tax regimes.""
Some scholars present an alternative justification for
territoriality, arguing that territorial systems are consistent with the
benefits taxation idea that each country should have "source"
jurisdiction over items of active business income properly attributable
to that country's economy." Julie Roin bases this argument on
linkages between tax policy and government benefits. 9 Nancy
34. See Graetz, supra note 6, at 280-81 ("This contrasts with the case of trade policy,
where free trade is thought to maximize national as well as global income, because the
mechanism of floating consumer prices." (citing Joel B. Slemrod, Free Trade Taxation and
Protectionist Taxation, 2 INT'L TAX & PUB. FIN. 471, 472 (1995))); Shaviro, supra note 6,
at 164-65 (contending that even if worldwide welfare improves national welfare by
encouraging cooperative behavior, unobserved defections should improve national
welfare).
35. Shaviro, supra note 3, at 417.
36. See Johannes Becker & Clemens Fuest, Foreign Income and Domestic
Deductions-A Comment, 63 NAT'L TAX J. 269, 271-72 (2010) (questioning CON welfare
function). Michael Graetz has observed that increasing worldwide welfare does not
necessarily increase national welfare in the case of international tax policy. See Graetz,
supra note 6, at 312.
37. David Hasen, Tax Neutrality and Tax Amenities, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 57, 121-22
(2012) (suggesting that, because worldwide systems do not present a race-to-the-bottom
problem, they are more likely than territorial regimes to promote welfare-enhancing
national investment).
38. See Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O'Hear, The "Original Intent" of U.S.
International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1077-78, 1080-81 (1997) (describing the 1923
League of Nations "economic allegiance" principle and also the allocation of more
jurisdiction to source countries under a subsequent, "more practical" 1925 United Nations
report).
39. See Julie Roin, Competition and Evasion: Another Perspective on International
Tax Competition, 89 GEO. L.J. 543, 603 (2001) ("Source countries should remain free to
use tax policies to attract business investment, just as residence countries should have the
right to tax their residents to support the social services. . . that they enjoy.").
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Kaufman frames it as an issue of inter-nation equity.4 However, this
benefits-taxation-based argument is not fully persuasive either, since
the relationship between business profit and the government benefits
facilitating that profit is so attenuated. Hugh Ault and David
Bradford have expressed the view that the idea of geographic income
source is meaningless.4 1
Another argument for a territorial system derives from the
observation that firms do not pay much tax on non-U.S. business
income under the current system, so the enactment of a properly
structured territorial system might actually increase federal income
tax collections from U.S.-parented MNCs.42 Under applicable anti-
deferral rules, a U.S.-parented MNC must currently pay tax on the
income of its foreign subsidiaries, known as controlled foreign
corporations ("CFCs"),43 to the extent such income falls into the
definition of "subpart F income,"" subject to the reduction of U.S.
tax under applicable foreign tax credit provisions.45 Thus,
U.S.-parented MNCs face an incentive to engage in planning to
minimize subpart F income, maximize tax savings via foreign tax
credit planning, and navigate other rules in order to reduce U.S. tax
40. See Nancy H. Kaufman, Fairness and the Taxation of International Income, 29
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 145, 198 (1998) (basing an international equity analysis on the
question of the "economic allegiance" of "income produced by international
transactions"); see also Jinyan Li, Improving Inter-Nation Equity through Territorial
Taxation and Tax Sparing, in GLOBALIZATION AND ITS TAX DISCONTENTS: TAX POLICY
AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS 117, 128 (Arthur J. Cockfield ed., 2010)
("[T]erritorial taxation of business profits would promote inter-nation equity .... ").
41. See Hugh J. Ault & David F. Bradford, Taxing International Income: An Analysis
of the U.S. System and Its Economic Premises, in TAXATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
11, 31 (Assaf Razin & Joel Slemrod eds., 1990) ("Income ... attaches to someone or
something that consumes and that owns assets. Income does not .come from some place
... ."); see also Kleinbard, supra note 2, at 750-52 (2011) (describing "[t]he [f]ruitless
[s]earch for [s]ource").
42. See, e.g., Grubert, supra note 14, at 814 (providing a static revenue gain estimate
of $9 billion based on 1996 Treasury data and evaluating possible behavioral responses to
territoriality adoption including "adjustments to overhead expenses and royalty
payments").
43. See I.R.C. § 957(a) (2006) (defining a foreign corporation as a "controlled foreign
corporation" if more than half of the foreign corporation's stock is owned by U.S.
shareholders).
44. Id. § 951(a). Subpart F is intended to describe most categories of mobile and
passive income. See, e.g., Stephen E. Shay, Exploring Alternatives to Subpart F, 82 TAXES
29, 29 (2004) (referring to subpart F's targeting of passive and base company income).
45. See I.R.C. § 901 (2006) (granting foreign tax credit): id. § 902 (providing for
deemed paid foreign tax credit when foreign corporations distribute dividends to certain
U.S. corporate shareholders); id. § 904 (providing foreign tax credit limitation rules).
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on non-U.S. income. 46 It is estimated that U.S. tax is currently
imposed on non-U.S. business income earned by non-U.S.
subsidiaries in MNC groups at a rate between 3% and 6%.4 U.S.-
parented MNCs may also seek ways to allocate income related to U.S.
operations to low-taxed non-U.S. affiliates and, conversely, to
allocate deductions away from low-taxed non-U.S. affiliates and
toward U.S. operations.48
Despite competing theoretical arguments about territoriality and
worldwide consolidation, territorial models lead current U.S.
international corporate income tax policy discussions. Proposals in
Congress include a discussion draft released by Representative David
Camp in 201149 and a bill proposed by Senator Michael Enzi in 2012.so
Bipartisan tax reform committees have also recommended
territoriality." The Obama administration has not declared support
46. See, e.g., Fleming, Peroni & Shay, supra note 2, at 85 (outlining U.S. corporate
international income tax planning opportunities); Kleinbard, supra note 2, at 706-15
(same); Lawrence Lokken, Whatever Happened to Subpart F? U.S. CFC Legislation After
the Check-the-Box Regulations, 7 FLA. TAX REV. 184, 202-06 (2005) (considering possible
solutions to the weakening of the subpart F rules as a result of the rules permitting entities
to "check the box" to elect to be treated as flow-through entities for U.S. tax purposes).
47. See HARRY GRUBERT & JOHN MUTTI, TAXING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
INCOME: DIVIDEND EXEMPTION VERSUS THE CURRENT SYSTEM 31-32 (2001) (reporting
a 3.3% estimate for the overall burden of a dividend repatriation tax assuming an excess
limitation foreign tax credit position and a non-U.S. effective tax rate below 10%);
Rosanne Altshuler & Harry Grubert, Where Will They Go if We Go Territorial? Dividend
Exemption and the Location Decisions of U.S. Multinational Corporations, 54 NAT'L TAX
J. 787, 797 (2001) (calculating a rate of 5.4% based on certain assumptions drawn in part
from 1992 Treasury tax return data; the rate also reflects the assumption that intangible
assets produce royalty income that bears the full U.S. top statutory rate for excess
limitation firms); Melissa Costa & Jennifer Gravelle, Taxing Multinational Corporations:
Average Tax Rates, 65 TAX L. REV. 391, 404 (2012) (calculating an average residual tax
rate imposed by the U.S. of 3.3% of foreign book income based on tax year 2007 data).
48. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Clausing, Multinational Firm Tax Avoidance and Tax
Policy, 62 NAT'L TAX J. 703, 711, 717 (2009) (estimating "financial" income-shifting and
"real" productive asset location-shifting responses to higher U.S. tax rates and concluding
that the financial effects, producing lost tax revenue of about $87 billion in 2002, were
more than double the real effects).
49. See Press Release, Representative Dave Camp Releases Technical Explanation of
International Tax Reform Plan (Oct. 26, 2011), http://waysandmeans.house.gov/news/
documentsingle.aspx?DocumentlD=266168 (describing an international corporate tax
reform proposal featuring a territorial tax system).
50. See United States Job Creation and International Tax Reform Act of 2012, S.
2091, 112th Cong. § 245A (2012) (recommending a territorial system featuring a 95%
dividend deduction for certain non-U.S. dividends). See generally GRAVELLE, supra note
22, at 24-28 (outlining and comparing several proposals).
51. See THE NAT'L COMM'N ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REFORM, THE
MOMENT OF TRUTH 33 (2010) (recommending a "territoriality" system for active
"foreign-source income"); see also JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCS-02-05, OPTIONS TO
IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 189 (2005)
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for a territorial plan, but instead supports a system that would provide
for a "minimum" rate of tax on foreign income.52 Yet a consensus
may be building, even among historically stalwart supporters of
worldwide consolidation, or at least one that takes careful measures
to minimize U.S. tax base erosion."
Another reason for the focus on a territorial reform derives from
the fact that all U.S. trading partners have territorial regimes. Others'
adoption of territoriality may be driven by a different policy analysis
and, in particular, the greater risk of capital flight in a small open
economy as opposed to a large open economy. 4 However, similar
risks concern U.S. policymakers, even though the U.S. economy still
leads the global economy. The adoption of worldwide consolidation
might produce an immediate reduction in the value of non-U.S. assets
held by U.S. firms." There is also concern that a worldwide
consolidation reform would incentivize U.S.-headquartered firms to
adopt non-U.S.-parented ownership structures.
Another way to explain the prevalence of territoriality in the
current U.S. international tax policy discourse is to posit that the
global corporate tax lobby is strong enough that only a territoriality
(recommending territoriality); PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM,
SIMPLE, FAIR AND PRO-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO Fix AMERICA'S TAX SYSTEM 102-05
(2005) (recommending territoriality).
52. See WHITE HOUSE & DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 7, at 13-15
(proposing a "minimum" rate of tax on non-U.S. income).
53. See Martin A. Sullivan, The Economic Case for Unlocking Foreign Profits, 136
TAX NOTES 7, 11 (2012).
54. See, e.g., How Other Countries Have Used Tax Reform to Help Their Companies
Compete in the Global Market and Create Jobs: Hearing Before the Comm. on Ways and
Means, 112th Cong. 4 (2011) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Stephen Edge), available
at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/edgetest.pdf ("Like any market place,
you first have to attract the traders to set up business and then make it attractive for
people to come to the UK and do business with them.").
55. Shaviro, supra note 3, at 394 (describing clientele effects that could produce "asset
swaps" between U.S. and non-U.S. investors upon the imposition of a worldwide tax).
56. See, e.g., Roger H. Gordon, Discussion, in FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM:
ISSUES, CHOICES AND IMPLICATIONS, supra note 4, at 365-67 (noting that worldwide
consolidation will incent multinationals owned by U.S. investors to locate outside the
United States or will incentivize U.S. investors to increasingly invest in non-U.S.
corporations instead of U.S.-parented MNCs). These are risks, rather than quantifiable
certain costs. For example, U.S.-headquartered companies might continue to incorporate
in the United States despite an increased incentive to expatriate. Cf Eric Allen & Susan
Morse, Tax Haven Incorporation for U.S.-Headquartered Firms: No Exodus Yet 21 (Dec.
20, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract-id=1950760 (finding that only forty-seven firms in a sample of almost
3000 U.S. IPOs were headquartered in the United States and incorporated outside the
United States).
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reform realistically presents an option.5 1 Pragmatic reformers who
prioritize a more logical system, including the repeal of a tax on
repatriation, may sensibly choose to consider how to optimize
territoriality in light of its higher political likelihood." In any case, the
leading place of territoriality in current tax reform debates makes it
the most practically important policy frame of reference for
consideration of the appropriate transition tax in the event of
corporate income tax reform enactment; most of this Article proceeds
under this assumption.
B. Constitutional Boundaries for Retroactive Taxes
The modern Supreme Court has refused to strike down any
retroactive tax statute on constitutional grounds,59 roundly dismissing
challenges to retroactive taxes under the Ex Post Facto Clause6 and
the Equal Protection Clause (absent a situation that calls for a
standard of review other than rational basis).6 ' However, it has taken
seriously recent claims that retroactive taxes violate substantive due
process.62 For example, in the 1994 case United States v. Carlton,' the
Court upheld a retroactive statute against a due process challenge but
emphasized the "modest" length of time-about one year-between
57. See generally Arlen & Weiss, supra note 19, at 368-69 (discussing realistic
corporate tax reform through a political theory lens); Doran, supra note 20, at 587-93
(theorizing the operation of public choice in the context of corporate tax reform).
58. See Sullivan, supra note 53, at 11 ("Instead of reflexively opposing any territorial
proposal, Democrats may want to begin carefully studying the details of a territorial
system that are necessary for preventing abuse.").
59. Saul Levmore, The Case for Retroactive Taxation, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 265, 270
n.12 (1993); see Charlotte Crane, Constitutional Limits on the Power to Impose a
Retroactive Tax, in BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTION AND THE PRACTICE OF
LAW 245, 248-49 (1988) (noting that the Court has invalidated only a few retroactive gift
and other transfer taxes at "initial enactment," even at the height of the Court's
substantive due process jurisprudence of the 1920s).
60. The Ex Post Facto Clause limits changes in criminal, but not civil, statutory law.
See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386,390 (1798).
61. See Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 144-45 (1938).
62. In addition, a small set of cases involving the retroactive repeal of savings and loan
benefits, which awarded damages based on the loss of expected regulatory and tax
benefits, relies on a contract analysis. See Charlotte Crane, Legitimate Expectations in Tax
Transitions: Are Roth IRA Conversions Different? 12-13 (August 2009) (unpublished
manuscript) (citing United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996) and Centex Corp.
v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 691 (2001), aff'd, 395 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2005)), available at
ttp://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1505120 (considering the possibility that
a Roth IRA conversion is "tantamount to a contract" and, therefore, its benefits may not
be constitutionally withdrawn without payment of damages).
63. 512 U.S. 26 (1994).
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the enactment of the statute and the retroactive amendment to the
statute."
In a concurrence, Justice O'Connor suggested that more than
one year's retroactivity would be problematic.' At least one state
court has held that a retroactive tax violated the due process clause
under the Carlton precedent because its retroactivity exceeded a
"modest" length of time. 66 The Carlton Court also placed some
importance on the fact that the retroactive amendment corrected an
apparent mistake in the original statute."
The constitutional issue is not a significant obstacle to the
imposition of some kind of tax that burdens the untaxed offshore
earnings of MNCs. However, it may affect the design of such a tax,
especially if policymakers have little appetite for constitutional
litigation.68 Substantive due process questions would be raised by an
explicit retroactive taxation approach that asked a U.S.-parented
MNC to go back to each tax year of its non-U.S. subsidiaries and
determine the tax that would have been due if the non-U.S. income of
such subsidiaries had been subject to U.S. tax. On the other hand, a
lump-sum transition tax should not raise any colorable constitutional
claim based on a retroactive taxation argument. Corporate taxpayers
cannot reasonably have relied on an expectation that no transition tax
64. See id. at 35 (applying rational basis test and upholding one-year retroactivity for
limitation of estate tax deduction for proceeds of sale of stock to employee stock
ownership plan).
65. See id. at 38 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("A period of retroactivity longer than the
year preceding the legislative session in which the law was enacted would raise, in my
view, serious constitutional questions."); see also id. at 40 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[T]he
critical event is the taxpayer's reliance on the incentive .... ).
66. See Tesoro Ref. and Mktg. Co. v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 246 P.3d 211,218 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2010) (holding unconstitutional a Washington statute made retroactive for
twenty-four years), rev'd en banc, 269 P.3d 1013 (Wash. 2012); see also Tate & Lyle, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 87 F.3d 99, 107-08 (3d Cir. 1996) (reversing Tax Court and upholding six-year
retroactive Treasury regulation in part because one-year retroactivity rule suggested in
O'Connor concurrence should not apply with equal force to regulations); In re Garden
City Med. Clinic, 137 P.3d 1058, 1064 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006) (overturning amendment to
Kansas tax refund statute which reduced refund period from three years to one year on
due process grounds); Oberhand v. Dir., 22 N.J. Tax 55, 62 (2005) (holding one-year
retroactive New Jersey statute invalid under state "manifest injustice" equitable doctrine),
rev'd, 23 N.J. Tax 431 (2006).
67. See Carlton, 512 U.S. at 32 ("Congress acted to correct what it reasonably viewed
as a mistake in the original ... provision that would have created a significant and
unanticipated revenue loss. There is no plausible contention that Congress acted with an
improper motive . . . .").
68. Cf Peter Baker, Supporters Slow to Grasp Health Law's Legal Risks, N.Y. TIMES,
June 24, 2012, at Al (recounting Affordable Care Act supporters' refusal to acknowledge
potential of constitutional challenge to law).
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would be imposed, since the possibility is an important part of the
discussions about a change to territoriality. In addition, a lump-sum
tax could be analyzed as a separate excise tax; the corporate income
tax was originally held constitutional under a similar excise tax
argument.69
C. Tax Treaty Concerns
In its network of bilateral tax treaties, the United States enters
into reciprocal undertakings to avoid double taxation of income. 0
The relevant treaty provision between the United States and the UK,
for example, states:
United States tax payable under the laws of the United States
and in accordance with the present Convention, whether
directly or by deduction, on profits or income from sources
within the United States ... shall be allowed as a credit against
any United Kingdom tax computed by reference to the same
profits or income by reference to which the United States tax is
computed."
In other words, roughly speaking, to the extent the UK taxes
U.S.-source income, the UK must reduce the tax liability due to
account for income taxes charged by the United States. A parallel
provision states that to the extent the U.S. taxes UK-source income,
the United States must reduce the tax liability due to account for
income taxes charged by the UK.72
The United States uses the foreign tax credit as its main tool to
fulfill this obligation. A foreign tax credit generally provides a
domestic firm with a credit for taxes paid to foreign jurisdictions with
respect to foreign source income." Some important U.S. trading
partners also extend foreign tax credits.74 However, countries with
69. Cf Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 151-52 (1911) (holding a corporate
income tax constitutional, i.e., not a direct tax subject to apportionment, because of its
nature as an "excise" tax). The Court subsequently overruled Flint on a different point of
law. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 542 (1985).
70. See REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME 169-81 (2007).
71. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, art. 23, Dec. 31, 1975, U.S.-
Gr. Brit.-N. Ir., 31 U.S.T. 5668, 5686.
72. See id
73. See AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 12, at 446-47, 454-57. However, "[a]ll systems
have limitations on the extent to which foreign tax paid can displace domestic tax
liability." Id. at 454; see, e.g., I.R.C. § 901 (2006) (foreign tax credit provision).
74. See AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 12, at 449-54.
564 [Vol. 91
20131 AN OFFSHORE PROFITS TRANSITION TAX
territorial systems have a smaller need for a foreign tax credit, since,
to the extent a territorial system eliminates domestic tax on foreign
income, a foreign tax credit is not needed to reduce domestic tax on
foreign income.7s
A U.S. tax treaty partner could object to a corporate offshore
profits transition tax if it reduced the tax revenue of the treaty
partner. The incursion of a transition tax into the pre-enactment
jurisdiction of a U.S. treaty partner would not necessarily present a
technical problem under U.S. law. The "last in time" rule provides
that a later-enacted statute trumps a U.S. tax treaty." Nevertheless,
because of the advantages of cooperative working relations with one's
treaty partners, a possibility of tax treaty partners' dissatisfaction with
a transition tax should present a legitimate concern for U.S.
policymakers. Stated differently, the question of treaty partners'
reactions may provide a negotiation opportunity, since U.S. provision
of relief from concerns about creditability of the transition tax might
be made contingent on appropriate treaty partner concessions.
A tax treaty partner objection to a corporate offshore profits
transition tax might arise if a U.S.-parented MNC claimed that the
transition tax should be credited against the tax liability due to the
treaty partner." This possibility is remote but not impossible." A
claim that a transition tax liability should support a foreign tax credit
in a non-U.S. jurisdiction makes little sense if source rules are well
aligned. This is because a corporate offshore profits transition tax, by
definition, is imposed on earnings over which the United States has
75. See id. at 464 (noting that dividend exemption systems have fully or partially
replaced indirect foreign tax credit rules in Canada, France, Sweden, Germany, Australia,
Japan, the UK, and the Netherlands).
76. See I.R.C. §§ 894(a)(1), 7852(d) (2006). The tax-specific last-in-time rule is
consistent with a more general rule relating treaties and statutes. See Whitney v.
Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194-95 (1888). For a succinct summary of key last-in-time
jurisprudence and literature, see generally Rebecca M. Kysar, On the Constitutionality of
Tax Treaties, 38 YALE J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2012).
77. If a transition tax payment were deductible against non-U.S. income for purposes
of non-U.S. tax law, it might also reduce tax paid to a treaty partner. Analysis of this
possibility is beyond the scope of this Article. However, in many cases a deduction should
be barred because the liability to pay the transition tax would lie with the U.S. parent
rather than with the non-U.S. subsidiary, and the latter is likely the taxpayer in the non-
U.S. jurisdiction.
78. A claim for deductibility of a corporate offshore profits transition tax against non-
U.S. income would also be unlikely, but for a different reason. In this case, the reason is
that the income of the relevant taxpayer, which is the non-U.S. subsidiary of the U.S.
parent, is likely determined by reference to expenses incurred by that subsidiary. But the
transition tax would be imposed on the parent, not on the subsidiary. Hence it should not
be deductible by the subsidiary.
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not exercised jurisdiction, roughly suggesting that the earnings derive
from non-U.S. source income. The non-U.S. jurisdiction to which the
non-U.S. source income is attributable should not extend a foreign
tax credit to a tax on income sourced to that non-U.S. jurisdiction.
This is because foreign tax creditability in a particular domestic
jurisdiction is generally limited to taxes on foreign-source, not
domestic-source, income.
Nevertheless, a claim that a transition tax should be credited
might come about for non-U.S. parents of first-tier U.S. subsidiaries
that own second-tier non-U.S. subsidiaries. Assume, for example, that
the U.S. company in the middle of this structure pays the transition
tax without recognizing repatriated income from the second-tier
non-U.S. subsidiary. The recognition of additional taxes without the
recognition of related income could support a claim of
"supercharged" foreign taxes deemed paid upon repatriations from
the U.S. subsidiary to the non-U.S. parent.,
A claim that a transition tax should be credited might also arise
in a U.S.-parented structure because of differences in source rules
between taxing jurisdictions; efforts at tax arbitrage; or some synergy
between the enumeration of creditable taxes in tax treaties and the
legislative description of the transition tax. If it were desirable to
address such tax treaty partner objections, it should be possible to
provide as a result of treaty negotiations or in the enacting legislation
that the transition tax is not intended to be a tax creditable against
non-U.S. tax under applicable tax treaties. The transition tax is not
structured as a usual income tax would be; rather, it can be
understood as a tax on a certain type of corporate wealth. Describing
the transition tax as an excise tax for this purpose might further the
goal of foreclosing creditability against non-U.S. income taxes, as
excise taxes are generally not creditable under bilateral income tax
treaties.80
II. TRANSITION TAX RATE
Efficiency, administrability, and equity are three classic metrics
of tax policy. They focus respectively on economic productivity; ease
of administration and enforcement; and fairness, including both
79. Thanks to Itai Grinberg and Steve Shay for helpful discussion of these points
relating to U.S.-parented and non-U.S. parented structures and foreign tax credit
concerns.
80. See, e.g., U.S. Model Income Tax Convention art. 23 (providing for relief of
double taxation via foreign tax credit); id. art. 2 (providing that covered taxes constitute
U.S. income taxes).
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vertical equity, or distributive justice, and horizontal equity, or
treatment of like-situated parties similarly.81 Part II applies these
metrics to the question of the appropriate transition tax rate. Part III
will apply the same metrics to the question of the appropriate
transition tax base.
A. Efficiency
The tax policy metric of "efficiency" refers to economic efficiency.
Its goal is to minimize the interference of a tax with decisions
taxpayers would make in the absence of the tax.82 The idea is that
decisions taxpayers make, in the absence of the tax, achieve more
optimal resource allocation, and therefore greater economic
productivity, than decisions they make in the presence of the tax.
1. Match Taxpayer Expectations for Transition Tax Efficiency
This Article argues that efficiency goals will be best advanced by
a corporate offshore profits transition tax on untaxed offshore
earnings if the burden of the transition tax matches pre-enactment
taxpayer expectations about likely tax burdens on offshore earnings.
These expectations may be formed by an independent estimate of a
likely transition tax, by a calculation of the net present value of the
expected eventual income tax on offshore earnings, or by unchanged
planning under existing law.
For taxes that have no prospective effect, like a one-time
transition tax imposed on a snapshot measure of accumulated
untaxed offshore earnings,84 the main efficiency concerns do not
81. See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE & DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 7, at 13-15
(citing "economic neutrality," fairness and equity (both actual and "perceived"), and
"simplicity" as goals of fundamental tax reform).
82. See HARVEY ROSEN & TED GAYER, PUBLIC FINANCE 329-47 (9th ed. 2010).
83. See LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS xvii
(2008) (noting basic income tax "tradeoff between distribution and distortion"). The
principle that taxes should not interfere with non-tax decisions is not always
determinative. For example, the Pigouvian tax theory posits that a tax detriment may
serve to discourage a negative externality that otherwise skews decisions away from their
economically efficient balancing point. See ROSEN & GAYER, supra note 82, at 84. A
carbon tax is one example of a Pigouvian tax. See Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach,
The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 499, 500 (2009) (identifying a
carbon tax as a particularly broad Pigouvian tax). However, the efficiency analysis in this
Article does not attempt to justify the transition tax based on a theory that it will reduce a
negative externality or otherwise purposefully incentivize taxpayer behavior.
84. Such a tax would be similar to a transition tax imposed in connection with a
corporate integration reform. See Alan J. Auerbach, Debt, Equity and the Taxation of
Corporate Cash Flows, in DEBT, TAXES, AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING 91, 94-97
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derive from a concern that taxpayers will plan to reduce the tax base
since the base for a one-time transition tax is formed by decisions
made before the measurement date for the transition tax base.15
Rather, the efficiency analysis related to a one-time transition tax
focuses mainly on the chance that taxpayers in the future will behave
differently as a result of the possibility that unexpected transition
taxes might be imposed again.86 In particular, U.S. multinational
taxpayers in the wake of an unexpected transition tax might invest
excess resources in handicapping or planning for other future
transition taxes" or increase their use of expatriation strategies in an
effort to avoid similar adverse congressional action in the future."
The possibility of changed behavior in the future is framed by the
fact that an explicit transition tax, like the transition tax proposed
here, would be unusual. Typically, Congress enacts changes in tax law
that implicitly affect taxpayers' economic position in a retroactive
fashion, for example, because the value of assets changes when the
tax law applicable to future income or consumption supported by
those assets changes." However, Congress does not typically enact
retroactive tax laws that explicitly tax income already earned.90 If
(John B. Shoven & Joel Waldfogel eds., 1990) (describing the American Law Institute
proposal to avoid windfall gains to old equity by tracing dividend payments to pre-
enactment earnings and the alternative of imposing a one-time tax on accumulated
earnings at the time of enactment).
85. See DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
ANALYSIS OF TRANSITION RELIEF AND RETROACTIVITY 19-25 (2000) (outlining the
importance of taxpayers' expectations about future policy changes); Shaviro, supra note 3,
at 423-24.
86. See SHAVIRO, supra note 85, at 19-25 (2000) (arguing that rational expectations
are "a useful benchmark" in assessing how taxpayers "anticipate ex ante and respond ex
post to retroactive rule changes."); Shaviro, supra note 3, at 423-24.
87. It is not clear whether a U.S.-parented corporation would in fact face less
exposure to adverse congressional action compared to a non-U.S. parented corporation.
See Susan C. Morse, Startup Ltd.: Tax Planning and Initial Incorporation, 13 FLA. TAX
REV. (forthcoming 2013) (proposing that uncertainty about future congressional action
adverse to tax haven-parented corporations may disincentivize startup corporations from
choosing tax haven incorporation).
88. See, e.g., Bret Wells, Cant and the Inconvenient Truth About Corporate Inversions,
136 TAX NOTES 429, 430-36 (2012) (describing three situations in which corporate
inversions can occur).
89. See, e.g., Alan J. Auerbach, Book Review, 39 J. ECON. LIT. 590, 590 (2001)
(reviewing DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
ANALYSIS OF TRANSITION RELIEF AND RETROACTIVITY (2000)) ("[Vjirtually all policy
changes are retroactive . . . ").
90. See SHAVIRO, supra note 85, at 104-10 (describing "anti-nominal retroactivity"
norm, acknowledging the "arbitrariness" of anti-nominal retroactivity, and offering
supporting arguments based on lower contracting costs, public choice limitation, and
consistency with short-term budgetary windows). The relevant statutory construction
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Congress did enact a similar retroactive tax, such as a corporate
offshore profits transition tax, taxpayers in the future might change
their behavior in anticipation of other similar future transition taxes.
Michael Graetz91 and Louis Kaplowl have separately articulated
theories founded on taxpayers' formation of rational expectations
about transition tax policy. These theories do not necessarily comport
with the conclusion suggested in this Article that a corporate offshore
profits transition tax should seek to match taxpayer expectations. The
work of Graetz and Kaplow can be read to support a retroactive
transition tax policy, or, in other words, one in which changes to
steady-state tax rules are explicitly applied retroactively.9 3 The
argument is that a fully retroactive rule might beneficially increase
rational taxpayers' anticipation of possible future changes in policy
when they make asset pricing and other decisions.9 This increased
anticipation of possible future changes in tax rules presumably has
benefits if the anticipated rule change is good policy, as Daniel
Shaviro has pointed out.95
This Article argues, however, that in the case of an underlying
territorial international corporate income tax reform, the transition
policy should not match the steady-state reform. The approach of
conforming transition tax policy to a steady-state policy of
territoriality would result in no transition tax at all, since a territorial
approach would exempt all non-U.S. business income from tax. And
so long as U.S.-parented MNCs do not in fact predict a retroactive
policy of territoriality, but rather expect to pay some tax on their pre-
principle holds that statutes have prospective effect absent a clear expression of
retroactive legislative intent. See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270
(1994) ("Since the early days of this Court, we have declined to give retroactive effect to
statutes burdening private rights unless Congress had made clear its intent.").
91. See Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax
Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47, 78-79 (1977) (rejecting the claim that fairness requires
transition relief, in part because affected parties should be able to predict a legislative
change with more and more confidence as it makes its way through the legislative
process).
92. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV.
509,551-60 (1986).
93. See Graetz, supra note 91, at 87 (noting "no overwhelming preference for
grandfathering"); Kaplow, supra note 92, at 551 ("Sometimes new legal rules should be
made fully retroactive....").
94. See Graetz, supra note 91, at 65-66 ("Reasonable expectations in the political
context may ... consist of only those which assess some subjective probability of change in
the law."); Kaplow, supra note 92, at 522-33.
95. See SHAVIRO, supra note 85, at 98-99 ("Transitional protection should be denied
when preferences and dispreferences are curtailed, and granted when they are
expanded.").
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enactment offshore earnings, refraining from imposing a transition
tax leaves tax revenue on the table from an efficiency point of view.
In other words, in the absence of a transition tax, U.S.-parented
MNCs would enjoy a windfall.96 The point of a transition tax that
meets taxpayer expectations is to convert the potential windfall into
tax revenue.
The following discussion identifies three possible sources of
taxpayer expectations about transition taxes: estimates based on
transition tax data points, estimates based on the assumption that
Congress will enact a transition tax policy that avoids windfall gain or
loss, and estimates based on the assumption that taxpayers do not
anticipate or cannot act on estimates of future transition tax policy.
The first estimating approach draws on examples of taxes in the range
of 0-10.5% and on descriptions of "small" or "modest" taxes. The
second and third approaches suggest a calculation of the present
value of the eventual tax on offshore earnings. The back-of-the-
envelope calculation offered below indicates a tax rate under the
second and third approaches of approximately 10%.
2. Estimates Based on Transition Tax Policy
One approach to expectations about a transition tax involves
estimating what transition tax the government might apply without
reference to any expectation about the present value of eventual tax
on untaxed offshore earnings. Taxpayers might refer to transition tax
proposals made in Congress, to the 2004 repatriation tax holiday
offered to U.S.-parented MNCs, to the UK's 2009 adoption of
territoriality, to Japan's 2009 adoption of territoriality, and to
references to transition tax options in the academic literature.
The 2004 U.S. repatriation holiday applied an effective rate of
5.25%, assuming a 35% marginal statutory rate. It used an 85%
dividends received deduction and allowed foreign tax credits to be
applied to "extraordinary" cash dividends distributed within a one-
year period to U.S. parents of MNCs.97 Repatriated funds exceeded
$300 billion," and some corporations have called for a repeat of the
96. See Shaviro, supra note 3, at 417-28 (identifying the "windfall" issue).
97. See I.R.C. § 965 (2006). To be precise, the 2004 law's operative provision allowed
an 85% deduction for such dividends, producing the shorthand description of a 5.25% tax
rate, since the top corporate statutory rate of 35% multiplied by (100% minus 85%)
equals 5.25%. Although foreign tax credits were not allowed for the deductible portion of
the dividend, they were allowed for the remaining 15%. See id. § 965(d).
98. See Thomas J. Brennan, What Happens After a Holiday?: Long-Term Effects of
the Repatriation Provision of the AJCA, 5 Nw. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y. 1, 1 (2010) ("[Floreign
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holiday on essentially the same terms." The Camp territoriality
proposal uses a similar approach, producing an effective 5.25% rate
for its transition tax on untaxed offshore earnings and profits. "
The bill introduced by Senator Michael Enzi in 20120' follows a
similar strategy but offers a lower 70% dividends received deduction
for a transition tax base that assumes a dividend of all accumulated
earnings and profits." This results in an effective rate of 10.5%
assuming a 35% marginal statutory rate."o3 Under the Enzi bill,
taxpayers must elect into the transition tax regime." Taxpayers not
electing to pay the transition tax would instead pay tax at full rates
when they repatriated pre-enactment earnings, and pre-enactment
earnings would be deemed to be paid before post-enactment
earnings, which would be exempt from tax upon repatriation.105
The UK reform fully exempted dividends paid by non-UK
subsidiaries to UK parent corporations from UK income tax subject
to "limited tax avoidance related exemptions."10 6 Pre-enactment
earnings were not taxed as a transition matter and likewise fully
escaped UK tax upon distribution. One commentator cited several
reasons for the decision: a belief that many taxpayers might
reasonably have expected to pay no UK tax upon such earnings under
pre-enactment law, a desire to minimize complexity, and a concern
subsidiaries distributed more than $300 billion in qualifying dividends to their U.S.
parents.").
99. See Sullivan, supra note 53, at 7 (describing the "WIN coalition" as a "group
formed solely for the purpose of securing a repeat of the one-time tax holiday for
repatriated foreign profits").
100. Representative Dave Camp made an international corporate tax reform proposal
in October 2011 that featured a territorial tax system and included a transition rule that
would deem the inclusion of a CFC's "accumulated deferred foreign income" in a U.S.
shareholder's income upon enactment. Under the Camp proposal, the inclusion would be
reduced by an 85% deduction, producing a rate of 5.25%; foreign tax credits would be
allowed on a pro-rated basis, and U.S. shareholders could elect to pay the transition tax
across eight annual installments. See Dave Camp, Camp Releases Technical Explanation of
International Tax Reform Plan, TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 27, 2011, LEXIS, 2011 TNT
208-28 (describing § 303 of the discussion draft and proposed changes to § 965 of the
Code).
101. United States Job Creation and International Tax Reform Act of 2012, S. 2091,
112th Cong., (2d. Sess., 2012).
102. See id. § 104 (providing for transition tax on shareholder's appropriate share of
earnings and profits of non-U.S. corporation subject to 70% dividends received
deduction).
103. A 70% dividends received deduction produces the shorthand description of a
10.5% tax rate, since the top corporate statutory rate of 35% multiplied by (100% minus
70%) equals 10.5%.
104. See S. 2091, § 104 (providing election for immediate transition tax).
105. See id. § 101 (proposing a new § 245A, including ordering rule).
106. Hearing, supra note 54, at 6 (statement of Stephen Edge).
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that UK corporations might expatriate, especially as the UK lacks a
rule like the U.S. anti-inversion provision contained in § 7874.107 The
UK experience provides a 0% transition tax data point.
Japan imposed no transition rule with respect to pre-enactment
offshore earnings. 108 Amounts distributed after the new law's effective
date are subject to the new rule, which exempts 95% of foreign
dividends but disallows related foreign tax credits. This rule generates
an effective tax rate of about 2% on repatriated foreign earnings.109
There are also suggestions in academic literature that "previously
unrepatriated income . .. could be subjected to a small one-time
tax,"" 0 perhaps at a rate between 1% and 5%.111 In the Camp
proposal, the revenue estimate produced by an effective 5.25%
transition tax happened to make the important revenue-neutrality
calculation come out even, suggesting the ability to adjust the rate to
fit the needs of a revenue-neutrality plug."2 Although the 5.25% rate
is not a round number, it may have acquired some salience that
encourages corporate taxpayers to grab onto it as they form
expectations about transition tax possibilities.
107. See id. at 8 ("There was clearly concern within government that past untaxed
profits should not be brought back tax free, especially when they might be the fruits of
CFC planning. Many commentators pointed out, however, that the idea that the
government would collect tax on those unremitted amounts was illusory. Unless there was
a sensible settlement on the CFC rules, many large groups would leave the UK (the threat
was a real one) and so those overseas unremitted profits would never, in fact, be
repatriated. The government decided, probably for practical reasons, to make no
distinction.").
108. See Jonathan Stuart-Smith, Yang-Ho Kim & Nicholas Walters, Ruling Party
Releases 2009 Tax Reform Proposals, 53 TAX NOTES INT'L 50, 50 (2009) ("The well-
publicized centerpiece of the reform proposals is the corporate income tax exemption for
foreign dividends repatriated to Japan from overseas subsidiaries.").
109. Hearing, supra note 54, at 1 (statement of Gary Thomas) (explaining the revised
Japanese rule). A Japanese tax rate of 40% imposed on 5% of foreign dividends translates
to a 2% tax on total foreign dividends. See Tom Neubig & Barbara M. Angus, Japan's
Move to Territorial Contrasts with US. Tax Policy, 54 TAX NOTES INT'L 252, 252 (2009)
(reporting the enactment of Japan's reform and citing a 41.3% 2009 Japanese statutory
corporate tax rate); see also Stuart-Smith, Kim & Walters, supra note 108, at 50 (discussing
Japan's 2009 tax reform proposals).
110. Grubert & Altshuler, supra note 4, at 347.
111. See Grubert, supra note 14, at 818 (pointing out the "simple" option of a one-time
charge on accumulated earnings).
112. International Tax Reform: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means,
112th Cong. 8 (2011) (statement of Martin A. Sullivan, Ph.D., Economist and Contributing
Editor, Tax Analysts), available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/sullivansrmlll7.pdf ("There is nothing
magical about the 5.25 percent rate. It can be raised or reduced depending on how much
revenue needs to be raised.").
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3. Existing Law and Taxpayer Expectations
An analysis of the tax burden on offshore earnings under existing
law can inform taxpayers' expectations about transition tax policy if
one of two premises is true. The first possible premise is that
taxpayers expect Congress to craft a transition tax that matches
windfall gain. The second possible premise is that taxpayers fail to
think about transition tax policy at all and instead assume that
existing law will simply continue.
The idea that taxpayers might expect a transition tax that
matches windfall gain113 means that taxpayers would expect transition
tax liability based on taxpayer expectations about the present value of
the eventual tax due on untaxed offshore earnings. This approach
draws support from the observation that Congress avoids increasing
taxes in an explicitly retroactive fashion, or what Daniel Shaviro calls
Congress's "anti-nominal retroactivity norm."" One possible
interpretation of the anti-nominal retroactivity norm is that taxpayers
should not expect the tax treatment of already-realizedns but
deferred items to change relative to their treatment under pre-
enactment law.11
It is also possible that taxpayers do not develop, or do not act on,
rational expectations about future changes in tax law." Corporate
tax directors may simply not perform the exercises of discovering and
113. See Shaviro, supra note 3, at 419 (arguing that transition tax policy should feature
an "aversion to windfall gain" because in the absence of a transition tax "shareholders at
the time of enactment would reap an enormous transition benefit").
114. SHAVIRO, supra note 85, at 104")5.
115. For example, pre-enactment accumulated offshore earnings have been accounted
for in controlled foreign corporation ("CFC") earnings and profits under U.S. tax
principles. See I.R.C. § 959 (2006) (providing ordering rules for distributions out of CFC
earnings and profits).
116. See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND AND SELECTED ISSUES
RELATED TO THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAX SYSTEM AND SYSTEMS THAT EXEMPT
FOREIGN BUSINESS INCOME 13 (2011) ("One issue is the treatment of earnings
attributable to periods before the enactment of the territorial legislation. One approach is
to have the exemption system apply only in respect of CFC earnings generated after the
effective date.").
117. This is consistent with the more general empirical observation that "taxes are not
a cost that taxpayers inevitably avoid." Douglas A. Shackelford & Terry Shevlin,
Empirical Tax Research in Accounting, 31 J. ACCT. & ECON. 321, 326 (2001); see also
Michelle Hanlon & Shane Heitzman, A Review of Tax Research, 50 J. ACCr. & ECON. 127,
129 (2010) ("[T]axes potentially affect many 'real' corporate decisions but their order of
importance is still an open question."). Hanlon and Heitzman emphasize the importance
of differentiating between types of investment in order to tease out the effect of taxes on
investment decisions. See id at 148 (giving the example of bonus depreciation provisions
that appear to have increased investment in some favored assets but not aggregate
investment).
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handicapping the disorganized web of tax policy change possibilities
presented by multiple jurisdictions and the interaction among them."'
The task of developing expectations must also consider the significant
legislative obstacles to change.119 Taxpayers may instead rely on the
heuristic of planning based on existing law. 120
In addition, corporate taxpayers may not be able to act quickly
on rational expectations about future changes in international tax law
because of a lack of liquidity in the market for the assets whose values
might change because of anticipated law changes. Michael Graetz
developed a theory about the valuation impact of anticipated legal
transitions in the context of the highly liquid municipal bond
market. 121 The market for wholly owned non-U.S. subsidiaries of U.S.
parents is far less liquid and prices may not fluctuate easily. 12 2
4. Calculating the Present Value of Future Tax on Untaxed Offshore
Earnings Under Existing Law
An analysis of the tax burden on offshore earnings under existing
law requires an estimate of the present value of future tax on such
earnings. The so-called "new view" of dividend taxation 23 suggests
118. See MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL., TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY: A PLANNING
APPROACH 170-72 (4th ed. 2009) (explaining that sufficiently high transaction costs
should block tax planning); Shackelford & Shevlin, supra note 117, at 341 (reporting on
studies that find, for example, that "firms facing high information and transaction costs
will sacrifice both tax and financial reporting benefits").
119. For example, in a much simpler situation involving a binary likelihood of a
continued or expired dividend tax cut as indicated by the likelihood of a Bush or Kerry
2004 presidential victory, empirical studies have reached mixed results regarding the link
between estimates of future dividend policy and relative changes in the value of high-
dividend-paying and low-dividend-paying firms. See Kevin A. Hassett & Kathryn
Newmark, Taxation and Business Behavior: A Review of the Recent Literature, in
FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM: ISSUES, CHOICES AND IMPLICATIONS, supra note 4, at
191, 203-04 (reporting conflicting studies).
120. See SHAVIRO, supra note 85, at 23 ("[T]he evidence for [anchoring] may suggest
that, in more dynamic and ongoing settings, people continue using obsolete rules of thumb
and struggle for a while to reconcile new information with them."); cf Sarah B. Lawsky,
Unknown Probabilities and the Tax Law, 65 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (arguing
that taxpayers' aversion to uncertainty affects how they respond to tax law).
121. See Graetz, supra note 91, at 54-57 (describing the effect of a change in law on
municipal bond pricing).
122. Cf Kleinbard, supra note 2, at 771 (arguing that the market for non-U.S.
subsidiaries of U.S.-parented MNCs is thin and that such MNCs enjoy a rate of return that
exceeds "world after-tax norms ... as a result of planning opportunities available only to a
subset of potential investors").
123. See Alan J. Auerbach, Wealth Maximization and the Cost of Capital, 93 QJ.
ECON. 433, 434 (1979). This view has been applied in the context of repatriation taxation
by David G. Hartman. See David G. Hartman, Tax Policy and Foreign Direct Investment,
26 J. PUB. ECON. 107, 119-20 (1985) (arguing that the allocation of capital between U.S.
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one approach to a systematic calculation of the present value of the
expected future tax on offshore untaxed earnings. This view
concludes that "dividend taxes do not increase the tax burden on
investment financed with retained earnings,"124 assuming that residual
income after investment will be distributed as dividends and that tax
rates are constant. Under these assumptions, "shareholders can get a
dividend now or let the firm reinvest at a constant rate of return and
pay a bigger dividend later."125 Although these assumptions are
incomplete, the "new view" offers a starting point for the analysis of
the present value of a future tax on dividends. 126
The new view concludes that the tax burden is the same on a
present value basis regardless of when the income on such retained
earnings is distributed.127 Thus, it suggests that corporations should
estimate the present value burden of the eventual tax on repatriated
earnings financed with retained earnings using their full effective rate.
If the effective rate equals the maximum U.S. statutory rate, this
suggests an expected tax burden equal to 35% of untaxed offshore
earnings, and accordingly a transition tax imposed at a rate of 35% of
untaxed offshore earnings.
Yet several assumptions underlying this view are not valid in the
instant case. First, not all controlled foreign corporation ("CFC")
earnings are financed with retained earnings, and, therefore, the new
view cannot predict the present value of a tax on all untaxed offshore
earnings.128 Fleming, Peroni, and Shay calculate the benefit of
deferral, comparing relative after-tax returns for new investment in a
CFC subject to a zero tax rate relative to new investment in a U.S.
parent, assuming earnings repatriation, constant rates of return, and
constant tax rates.129
parent and non-U.S. subsidiary should depend on the comparative after-tax rates of
return).
124. George R. Zodrow, On the "Traditional" and "New" Views of Dividend Taxation,
44 NAT'L TAX J. 497, 500 (1991).
125. Hanlon & Heitzman, supra note 117, at 161.
126. See Kimberly A. Clausing, Tax Holidays (and Other Escapes) in the American
Jobs Creation Act, 57 NAT'L TAX J. 331, 334-35 (2005) (noting that despite the new view,
incentives to repatriate can vary over time if a firm views the repatriation tax "not as an
unavoidable eventuality... but as something that can be avoided through careful tax
planning or simply patience").
127. See Hartman, supra note 123, at 119-20 (arguing that the allocation of capital
between U.S. parent and non-U.S. subsidiary should depend on the comparative after-tax
rates of return).
128. See Zodrow, supra note 124, at 497 ("There is general agreement that dividend
taxes reduce the return to investment financed with new share issues.. . .").
129. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, supra note 2, at 96-104 (2009) (calculating benefit of
deferral for a new investment decision).
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Second, there is reason to think that corporate tax rates will be
lower in the future. There is support from several corners for a
general reduction in the U.S. corporate tax and interest rates in a
repeat of the 2004 repatriation holiday.13 0 Repeats of tax amnesties
are sometimes thought to be bad policy because they may undermine
the general perception of the fairness of the tax system and reduce
ongoing compliance with the regular rules."' But if the amnesty tax
burden approaches the present value of the tax burden that would be
legally obtained under existing law, these objections have less force.
Third, using the maximum U.S. statutory rate is not appropriate
because foreign tax credits will reduce firms' effective tax rate.
Fourth, the assumption that non-U.S. subsidiaries will eventually
repatriate earnings to the U.S. parent under current law is almost
certainly not correct. Substantial investment opportunities outside the
United States should attract at least some reinvestment of earnings
offshore.13 2 Constraints related to the accounting disadvantages of
reducing "permanently reinvested earnings" accounts discourage
repatriation. 33 Finally, borrowing by the U.S. parent is a good
economic substitute for repatriation in many cases.134
For all of these reasons, it is reasonable to think that the present
value of the expected future U.S. tax on offshore untaxed earnings is
substantially lower than the maximum U.S. statutory rate multiplied
by such earnings.
But how much lower than 35%? Shaviro suggests that an
appropriate transition tax rate might be in the range of 20% if gauged
to approximately equal the present value of taxpayers' future tax
130. See Clausing, supra note 126, at 335 (noting the possibility that firms may
anticipate additional repatriation holidays).
131. See Craig M. Boise, Breaking Open Offshore Piggybanks: Deferral and the Utility
of Amnesty, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 667. 701-05 (2007) (outlining fairness and
compliance disadvantages of repeat amnesties).
132. See Lisa Bryant-Kutcher, Lisa Eiler & David A. Guenther, Taxes and Financial
Assets: Valuing Permanently Reinvested Earnings, 61 NAT'L TAX J. 699, 717 (2008)
(evaluating firms' investment in non-U.S. operating assets versus financial assets).
133. See John R. Graham, Michelle Hanlon & Terry Shevlin, Real Effects of
Accounting Rules: Evidence from Multinational Firms' Investment Location and Profit
Repatriation Decisions, 49 J. ACCT. RES. 137, 181 (2011) (finding that "the accounting
expense deferral is important to companies and appears to provide an incentive ... to
move operations and investments overseas and to reinvest foreign earnings overseas").
134. See, e.g., Rosanne Altshuler & Harry Grubert, Repatriation Taxes, Repatriation
Strategies and Multinational Financial Policy, 87 J. PUB. ECON. 73, 94-95 (2002) (listing
strategies involving borrowing and foreign tax credit planning that "achieve the equivalent
of repatriation ... without incurring the tax costs of repatriation"); Kleinbard, supra note
2, at 762-68 (describing practical aspects of "lock-out" effect).
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liability related to offshore earnings.13 s This rate would be a flat tax
rate, without allowance for foreign tax credits. Shaviro cites two
calculations in support. One is Harry Grubert and Rosanne
Altshuler's calculation that worldwide consolidation would permit a
tax rate of 28%, rather than 35%, on non-U.S. earnings.'3 6 The other
is Shaviro's own work with Kimberly Clausing that calculates rates of
U.S. tax on foreign income that would be necessary to effect a
"burden-neutral" change of policy from a foreign tax credit to foreign
tax deductibility. 137
The Grubert and Altshuler calculation is based on a static
analysis that examines the amount of tax collected from multinational
corporations in 2002 and estimates the tax rate that would have to be
imposed on non-U.S. business income in order to match that tax
collection under a worldwide consolidation setting. The calculation of
a 28% rate equivalence, however, does not support the use of a
similar rate for a flat-rate transition tax for at least two reasons.
First, as Shaviro points out, the 28% rate assumes the continued
granting of foreign tax credits. If a transition tax seeks to match
taxpayer expectations about the present value burden of eventual
taxes on non-U.S. earnings without actually allowing FTCs, it should
make a downward adjustment to account for foreign tax credits. 138
These could be substantial. Grubert's recent work suggests that the
average effective tax rate on foreign income was about 21% in 1996
and 16% in 2004.139 These figures might suggest an average tax rate
across all affected taxpayers of between 7% and 12%, after foreign
tax credits, if the burden-neutral 28% rate were adopted."o
135. Shaviro, supra note 3, at 427.
136. See Grubert & Altshuler, supra note 4, at 347 ("[T]he burden-neutral rate based
on 'static' calculations is about 28 percent.").
137. See Kimberly Clausing & Daniel Shaviro, A Burden-Neutral Shift from Foreign
Tax Creditability to Deductibility?, 64 TAX L. REv. 431, 435-38 (2011) (deriving equivalent
tax rates algebraically).
138. For example, the petroleum firms that Grubert and Altshuler identify as
continuing in excess credit positions under the burden-neutral 28% proposal would
presumably not expect to pay tax upon repatriation. See Grubert & Altshuler, supra note
4, at 348 & n.28.
139. See Harry Grubert, Foreign Taxes and the Growing Share of U.S. Multinational
Company Income Abroad: Profits, Not Sales, Are Being Globalized, 65 NAT'L TAX J. 247,
281 (2012) (reporting a decline in the average effective foreign tax rate from about 21% in
1996 to about 16% in 2004); see also Kevin S. Markle & Douglas A. Shackelford, Cross-
Country Comparisons of Corporate income Taxes, 65 NAT'L TAx J. 493, 511 (2012)
(finding that effective tax rates have fallen steadily over the past two decades).
140. In other words, 28% minus 21% equals 7%; 28% minus 16% equals 12%.
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Second, the 28% rate is based on 2002 numbers. There is
evidence that effective foreign tax rates have declined.14 ' This might
prompt taxpayers to refrain from repatriating income, which would
reduce the benchmark tax collection that a worldwide consolidation
system sought to match and would, therefore, reduce the burden-
neutral worldwide consolidation rate, even after considering the
impact of reduced foreign tax credit availability.142
The Clausing and Shaviro approach assumes that a certain
foreign tax amount is deemed paid when a dividend is distributed
from a non-U.S. subsidiary to a U.S. parent, and it asks what U.S. tax
rate should apply under a system that only permits deductibility of
foreign taxes to make the result the same as a 35% U.S. tax rate
under a tax credit system.14 The burden-neutral U.S. tax rate under a
foreign tax deductibility system is higher if the foreign tax is lower.'"
As Shaviro points out, this approach has the advantage of accounting
for the difference between foreign tax credits and a deduction for
foreign taxes; however, it does not account for the possibility that
accumulated foreign earnings will never be repatriated.'45 Translating
a rate under a foreign tax credit system to a rate under a foreign tax
deduction system has relevance because a corporate offshore profits
transition tax would be imposed on a base that reflected a deduction
for foreign taxes.4 6
Shaviro explains that if the foreign tax rate is 20% with foreign
tax credits,147 the burden-neutral tax rate with only a deduction for
foreign taxes is 18.8%.148 This means that at the moment of dividend
distribution, either a foreign tax credit system with a U.S. tax of 35%
or a foreign tax deduction system with a U.S. tax of 18.8% would
produce the same U.S. tax. In this example, a tax of fifteen cents on
141. See Grubert, supra note 139, at 281 (reporting a decline in the average effective
foreign tax rate from about 21% in 1996 to about 16% in 2004); see also Costa & Gravelle,
supra note 47, at 394 (reporting a foreign average tax rate for all industries of 15.6% based
on 2006 tax return data).
142. See Altshuler & Grubert, supra note 134, at 74-75 (2002) (noting the connection
between lower foreign tax rates and higher incentives to avoid repatriation).
143. See Clausing & Shaviro, supra note 137, at 436 (listing equivalent tax rates).
144. Id.
145. Shaviro, supra note 3, at 426-27 (2011).
146. See infra note 200 and accompanying text (explaining that earnings and profits are
reduced by foreign income taxes paid).
147. This figure of 20% is roughly consistent with evidence suggesting that the average
foreign effective tax rate was about 21% in 1996 and 16% in 2004. See Grubert, supra note
139, at 281.
148. See infra Part III (discussing two tax bases-the tax base of earnings and profits
and the accounting base of unremitted earnings-both reflecting a deduction for foreign
taxes incurred).
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the dollar of pre-tax foreign income would accrue to the U.S.
Treasury under either system.4 9
The burden-neutral rate assuming full eventual repatriation
should be reduced further to account for the likelihood that U.S.
MNCs will never repatriate some of their untaxed accumulated
offshore earnings. The amount of the reduction depends on the
percentage of these earnings that MNCs leave overseas permanently.
The available measure of this percentage is an accounting figure,
drawn from the percentage of unremitted earnings measured for
accounting purposes and designated as permanently reinvested
earnings ("PRE").'
Across all firms, Jennifer Blouin, Linda Krull, and Leslie
Robinson report PRE as a percentage of all unremitted earnings of
about 73%."11 This translates to a lower bound of about 27% for the
percentage of unremitted earnings corporations, in the aggregate,
plan to repatriate. This is because PRE can result from the
designation of elements of outside book-tax basis differences that do
not arise from unremitted earnings.15 2 In addition, PRE levels may
overstate firms' overseas investment intentions, since designating
earnings as PRE permits firms to avoid stating a deferred tax liability
and reduce current earnings.
Because 27% represents a lower bound measure of firms'
repatriation intentions, the calculations in the table below use
assumptions of 40% and 50% to illustrate the effect on the
appropriate transition tax rate of firms' repatriation intentions. The
calculatiois in the table below also use foreign tax rates of 15% and
149. Under the foreign tax credit system, $1 multiplied by 35% equals a tentative U.S.
tax of $0.35, which is reduced by a foreign tax credit of $0.20 to $0.15. Under a foreign tax
deduction system, taxable income would equal $1 minus $0.20 or $0.80. Therefore, $0.80
multiplied by a U.S. tax rate of 18.8% also equals $0.15.
150. See infra Part III.C for further discussion on PRE.
151. See Jennifer Blouin, Linda Krull & Leslie Robinson, Where in the World Are
"Permanently Reinvested" Foreign Earnings? 39 (Working Paper, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2154662 (reporting PRE of about $882
billion and total foreign retained earnings of about $1.2 trillion for sample of about 700
firms).
152. See EDWARD ABAHOONIE & LEAH ALFONSO, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS,
DEFERRED TAXES ON FOREIGN EARNINGS: A ROAD MAP 6 (2010), available at http://
www.pwc.com/us/enitax-accounting-services/assets/deferred-taxes-foreign-earnings.pdf
(giving a list of possible other contributors to outside book-tax basis differences including
currency translation adjustments, acquisitions accounted for using the purchase method of
accounting, and differences related to stock-based compensation).
153. See, e.g., Linda K. Krull, Permanently Reinvested Foreign Earnings, Taxes, and
Earnings Management, 79 ACCT. REv. 745, 746, 765 (2004) (noting earnings management
incentives).
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20% to illustrate the effect on the appropriate transition tax rate of
average historic foreign taxes imposed upon the pool of untaxed
accumulated offshore earnings. The tax rates are calculated as if the
tax would be imposed upon a base of untaxed offshore earnings that
reflected a deduction for foreign taxes, but would not be reduced by
foreign tax credits.




Foreign Tax uc. Rat Rate under Tax Rate
Rate D ed t, 40% under 50%
red', Repatriation Repatriation
Assumption Assumption
15% 23.5% 9.4% 11.75%
20% 18.8% 7.52% 9.4%
A final approach to determine firms' estimates of the present
value cost of their eventual repatriation of earnings would refer to the
incremental cost to firms of using unrepatriated funds.'s For
example, a firm that borrows against its offshore earnings will incur
some costs in order to do so. As another example, a firm may accept a
lower rate of return on non-U.S. investments in order to avoid
repatriation. There exist positive estimates of the "excess burden"
associated with avoiding the repatriation of offshore funds, although
these are expressed as a percentage of annual earnings and profits,
rather than total accumulated offshore earnings.' 6 There also exists a
positive estimate of the loss in value that firms may suffer if they keep
offshore earnings in cash rather than investing the earnings in foreign
operations or repatriating the earnings. 5 7
154. The burden-neutral rates are calculated in Clausing & Shaviro, supra note 137, at
436.
155. See Altshuler & Grubert, supra note 134, at 74-75 (noting the connection between
lower foreign tax rates and higher incentives to avoid repatriation).
156. Id. at 79 (reporting efficiency losses of about 1% and 0.7% of total pre-tax
income).
157. See Bryant-Kutcher, Eiler & Guenther, supra note 132, at 717 (finding that firms
who invest permanently reinvested earnings in cash rather than operating assets suffer a
decline in valuation).
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B. Administrability
The principal transition alternative to the lump-sum corporate
offshore profits transition tax outlined here (leaving aside possibilities
of full exemption for accumulated untaxed offshore earnings) is a
tracing rule that would match post-enactment dividend distributions
to pre-enactment earnings and tax such dividends out of pre-
enactment earnings."' One can imagine last-in-first-out, first-in-first-
out, ratable, or other tracing rules, as well as the incredible
complexity involved with complying with and administering any such
rules.'5 9
This Article advocates a lump-sum corporate offshore profits
transition tax largely for reasons of administrability.'se Such a tax
would substitute for any actual taxation of pre-enactment untaxed
offshore earnings; after payment of the transition tax, a firm would
face no further U.S. tax liability with respect to pre-enactment
earnings and could no longer claim credits relating to pre-enactment
foreign taxes.16 1 Even though the transition tax considered here is a
lump-sum tax, it still raises design questions, the resolution of which
could result in less or more complexity.
One question is whether a corporate offshore profits transition
tax should be assessed at a flat rate or at a rate that varies in
accordance with a taxpayer's marginal tax rate. This Article advocates
a flat rate because of its administrability advantages and despite its
horizontal equity drawbacks, as discussed further below. 62 Another
question is whether foreign tax credits should be allowed to reduce
the transition tax. As suggested by the approach taken in the above
calculations of equivalent tax burdens, this Article advocates a
transition tax that does not allow any reductions for foreign tax
credits.
To frame the consideration of complexity, consider the basic
technical outlines of the 2004 tax holiday on dividends repatriated by
158. See GRAVELLE, supra note 22, at 22 (outlining transition options).
159. See Auerbach, supra note 84, at 115-18 (describing the ALI proposal to avoid
windfall gains to old equity by tracing dividend payments to pre-enactment earnings and
alternative of imposing a one-time tax on accumulated earnings at the time of enactment).
160. To relieve liquidity constraints, the lump-sum transition tax could be payable over
a number of years. The Camp proposal suggests an eight-year payment period. See
GRAVELLE, supra note 22, at 25-26 (describing Camp proposal). An eight-year period
should ensure that payments are actually made within the ten-year revenue estimate
window.
161. Pre-enactment losses present another issue not covered here. See GRAVELLE,
supra note 22, at 22-23 (raising the issues of pre-enactment losses and foreign tax credits).
162. See infra Part II.D.
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U.S. parents of MNCs. The section applied to "extraordinary" cash
dividends, distributed within a one-year period and used for a
purpose specified in the corporation's "domestic reinvestment
plan."'63 Its operative provision allowed an 85% deduction for such
dividends, producing the shorthand description of a 5.25% tax rate,
since the top corporate statutory rate of 35% multiplied by 15%64
equals 5.25%. Although foreign tax credits were not allowed for the
deductible portion of the dividend, they were allowed for the
remaining 15%.16-
In the case of the 2004 repatriation holiday, some of the
complexities relate to the determination of the tax base. Part III of
this Article will consider related tax base issues for a COPE transition
tax. Other complexities of the 2004 repatriation holiday relate to the
tax rate. First, the rate of tax varies by taxpayer; it is not really 5.25%,
but rather the particular corporate taxpayer's marginal rate
multiplied by 15%.166 The inclusion of the residual dividend in income
means that the tax is lower if the taxpayer's marginal tax rate in the
year of inclusion is lower. Second, the allowance of foreign tax credits
with respect to the nondeductible portion of the dividend affects the
final amount of the tax and, therefore, the rate of tax actually paid to
the U.S. government with respect to the tax base. 167 The foreign tax
credit means that the tax is lower if the taxpayer's non-U.S. tax rate is
higher.
163. See I.R.C. § 965 (2006). Although such plans were intended to ensure that cash
dividends covered by § 965 were used by the repatriating company to invest in the U.S.
economy, they failed to do so. Most of the repatriated funds have been traced to transfers
to shareholders through dividends or share repurchases. See Jennifer Blouin & Linda
Krull, Bringing it Home: A Study of the Incentives Surrounding the Repatriation of Foreign
Earnings Under the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, 47 J. ACCT. RES. 1027, 1029
(2009) (reporting that repatriating firms increased share repurchases).
164. 15% equals 100% minus the permitted deduction of 85%.
165. See I.R.C. § 965(d).
166. See Brennan, supra note 98, at 4 ("The mechanism used was a temporary tax
deduction for U.S. parent corporations in the amount of 85% of cash dividends that were
received from foreign subsidiaries and met the requirements of the newly created I.R.C.
§ 965. Thus, if the normal corporate tax rate was 35%, an 85% deduction resulted in an
effective tax rate of 5.25%.").
167. See I.R.S. Notice 2005-64, 2005-36 I.R.B. 471 § 4 (outlining rules disallowing
"credit or deduction for foreign taxes on deductible portion of qualifying dividends"); Dr.
Anthony P. Polito, fI 7150.04.A. Controlled Foreign Corporations, Tax & Acct. Center
(BNA), http://taxandaccounting.bna.com/btac/T6200/split_display.adp?fedfid=15887973&
vname=tpsporft&wsn=500868000&fn=15887973&split=0 (last visited Jan. 4, 2013)
(subscription required) ("[Tihe taxpayer was allowed to pick those dividends that received
the 85% deduction and those that did not, receiving instead the foreign tax credit.").
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A corporate offshore profits transition tax could use a flat rate,
itself adjusted to account for foreign tax credit deductibility rather
than creditability as described above, and deny explicit foreign tax
credits to avoid the complications described above. However, as
discussed below in Part II.C, a flat rate without foreign tax credit
allowances presents equity costs. Part II.D suggests a resolution of the
tension between administrability and equity.
C. Equity
Three equity comparisons present themselves in considering the
proper structure of a corporate offshore profits transition tax. First,
there is the question of the equitable role of the corporate taxes in
general. Second, there is the question of relative winners and losers in
the event of a revenue-neutral business tax reform effort. Third, there
is the question of relative winners and losers among the global
multinationals expected to pay the transition tax.
The first question, relating to the role of corporate taxes in
general, is beyond the scope of this paper. One approach emphasizes
the regulatory origins of the corporate income tax in the United
States. 16  Another approach posits that the incidence of corporate
taxes falls on shareholders,''6 and, assuming that shareholders are
168. Several scholars have told the story of the origins of the U.S. corporate income tax
in 1909 as, at least in part, a way to "express the social antipathy towards monopoly
power." See, e.g., Ajay K. Mehrotra, The Public Control of Corporate Power: Revisiting the
1909 U.S. Corporate Tax from a Comparative Perspective, 11 THEOR. INO. LAW. 497, 537
(2010). Compare Avi-Yonah, supra note 13, at 1247 (arguing that the corporate income
tax reduces the wealth of corporations and therefore the-power of corporate managers),
and Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the Corporate
Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53, 113 (1990) (noting that a corporate tax was expected to
provide advantages of federal supervision and increased disclosure), with Steven A. Bank,
Entity Theory as Myth in the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 43 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 447, 452 (2001) (arguing that corporate tax was meant as a "substitute or 'proxy' for
taxing corporate shareholders directly").
169. Arnold Harberger's classic analysis of corporate tax incidence reached the
conclusion that capital bears the burden of a corporate income tax under an assumption
that the economy was closed, so that capital had to choose between a taxed or untaxed
sector and would, in the long run, accept lower after-tax rates of return from both
corporate stock ownership and other investment opportunities. See Arnold C. Harberger,
The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 70 J. POL. ECON. 215, 227-30 (1962). Some
capital owners would bear the burden of the tax through reductions in asset prices and
some through reductions in returns on investment. See Alan J. Auerbach, Who Bears the
Corporate Tax? A Review of What We Know, in 20 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 1, 12
(James M. Poterba ed., 2006). In contrast, a model that assumes an open economy where
imported and home-produced goods are perfectly substitutable and capital is perfectly
mobile concludes that the corporate income tax falls at least in part on labor. See
WILLIAM M. GENTRY, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE ON THE
INCIDENCE OF THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX 16 (2007) ("If capital is mobile (and labor
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relatively well off, concludes that corporate taxes therefore improve
the progressivity of a tax system. But the incidence assumption in
particular is open to debate, and the debate involves an enormous
amount of inconclusive literature, which this Article will not
discuss. 170
The second question relates to the possibility of revenue-neutral
business tax reform, which is how some recent proposals have been
framed. For example, a proposal to reduce the U.S. corporate tax rate
to 25% and pay for the rate reduction within the four corners of a
corporate tax package required the identification of base-broadening
revenue raisers worth about $1 trillion over the ten-year budget
window. 171 Some revenue could be raised by familiar base-broadening
measures, such as the repeal of accelerated depreciation and the
domestic production activities deduction, 172 in addition to the repeal
of deferral itself.173 However, such revenue raisers appear insufficient
to reduce the U.S. federal corporate tax rate to 25%.171 Further, the
is immobile) across jurisdictions, then labor's share of the tax burden can be high."). But
if, despite the theoretical openness of the economy, capital is not perfectly mobile, or
imports and local goods not perfectly substitutable, it becomes more likely that capital
bears the burden of the corporate income tax, consistent with the original Harberger
theory. See, e.g., Jane G. Gravelle, The Corporate Income Tax: Economic Issues and
Policy Options, in TAX POLICY IN THE REAL WORLD 15,22 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1999).
170. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Clausing, In Search of Corporate Tax Incidence, 65 TAX L.
REV. 433, 434-44 (2012) (surveying and critiquing corporate tax incidence literature).
171. See SENATOR GREGG & SENATOR WYDEN, ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF
S. 3018 1-2 (2010), http://www.wyden.senate.gov/downloadljoint-committee-on-taxation-
estimated-score-of-the-bipartisan-tax-fairness-and-simplification-act-of-2010 (giving a
"very preliminary" ten-year cost estimate of the Wyden-Coats 24% "corporate flat tax" as
$1.1 trillion).
172. See generally Memorandum from Thomas A. Barthold to Undisclosed Recipients,
Chief of Staff, Joint Comm. Taxation (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.novoco.comihottopics/
resource_files/jct-memotax-expenditure-repeal_102711.pdf (citing "very preliminary"
estimates provided in connection with Camp bill that show ten-year revenue of about $724
billion from repeal of accelerated depreciation, $164 billion from repeal of the "domestic
production activities" deduction, $160 billion from repeal of R&D expensing, and $70
billion from repeal of LIFO accounting).
173. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, REDUCING THE DEFICIT: SPENDING AND
REVENUE OPTIONS 186 (2011) (providing a revenue estimate of about $114 billion);
GREGG & WYDEN, supra note 171, at 1-2 (providing a ten-year revenue estimate of $583
billion for deferral repeal together with the application of per-country foreign tax credit
rules); see also Grubert & Altshuler, supra note 4, at 347 (reporting "static calculations" of
a burden-neutral 28% rate on foreign corporate income only under worldwide
consolidation assuming no changes to domestic corporate income tax rules and no taxation
of "the pool of previously unrepatriated income").
174. See Jane G. Gravelle, Reducing Depreciation Allowances to Finance a Lower
Corporate Tax Rate, 64 NAT'L TAX J. 1039, 1052-53 (2011) (arguing that repealing
accelerated depreciation will not raise as much revenue as suggested outside the constraint
of the budget window and pointing out that some suggested base broadening measures
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stated revenue increases include the effects of repealing these
incentives for non-corporate business taxpayers, which may not be
politically feasible."
Incorporated firms with primarily domestic business stand to
gain if the corporate tax rate is lowered, but they stand to lose to the
extent business tax preferences will be repealed to pay for such a rate
cut. Incorporated firms with global businesses stand to gain if the
corporate tax rate is lowered, albeit somewhat less than domestic
firms, given that the offshore business of MNCs is often already taxed
at low rates. Therefore, global MNCs simultaneously seek to maintain
a low overall tax rate through the enactment of a favorable
territoriality regime.176 Finally, unincorporated businesses will not
benefit from a corporate rate cut, but will suffer if business tax
incentives are repealed to pay for such a rate cut.177
Revenue-neutral adoption of territoriality thus raises the
possibility that global multinationals will benefit from a more
favorable tax regime going forward relative to the pre-enactment
rules, while incorporated and unincorporated domestic businesses will
face less-advantageous rules after the reform compared to the pre-
enactment rules. There are, of course, a large number of small moving
pieces in this analysis. Territoriality adoption itself could increase or
decrease the effective tax burden on global multinationals,
depending, for example, on the rules allocating income and deduction
items between U.S. and non-U.S source categories, as well as business
and non-business categories. 78 Nevertheless, territoriality reform may
would also hurt unincorporated businesses); Jane G. Gravelle, Practical Tax Reform for a
More Efficient Income Tax, 30 VA. TAX REV. 389, 402-06 (2010) (listing and evaluating
different base-broadening options, including deferral repeal); see also International Tax
Reform, supra note 112, at 9-10 (2011) (arguing that existing revenue raisers in Camp plan
would not provide sufficient room to reduce the corporate tax rate).
175. See Stephen E. Shay, Daunting Fiscal and Political Challenges for US International
Tax Reform, 66 BULL. INT'L TAX'N 229, 232 (2012) ("To date, there is no clear path to a
politically realistic revenue neutral tax reform, not to mention a reform that would
contribute to deficit reduction. Even though there appear to be shared objectives in
relation to business tax reform, its intersection with the tax on individual business owners
and investors makes it difficult to achieve independently.").
176. See Martin A. Sullivan, Tax Reform Goals Differ for Corporate Coalitions, 134
TAX NOTES 1481, 1481, 1484 (2012) (comparing interests of domestically focused
companies such as Ford, Macy's, and UPS, which focus on rate reduction and the
protection of tax breaks such as LIFO accounting or accelerated depreciation, depending
on the firm's industry; and global companies such as Cisco, Google, and Pfizer, which
prioritize territoriality and the continued low taxation of non-U.S. income).
177. See Shay, supra note 175, at 232.
178. See, e.g., Graetz & Oosterhuis, supra note 14, at 774-76 (listing design options for
defining business income).
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present equity reasons to impose a corporate offshore profits
transition tax on global businesses to help offset the benefits of the
territoriality reform to those businesses.
The third equity question concerns relative winners and losers
among the global multinationals who would be expected to pay the
transition tax. The adoption of the underlying steady-state
territoriality reform itself will produce winners and losers among such
global MNCs."'7 With respect to the appropriate tax rate for the
transition tax, one question is whether the tax rate should vary
according to the marginal tax rate applicable to different firms. A
related question is whether foreign tax credits should be allowed.
The firms with lower domestic tax rates will expect lower tax
upon repatriation than those with higher domestic tax rates. Firms
with higher foreign tax rates will also expect lower tax upon
repatriation, because they will expect higher sheltering from foreign
tax credits."' Should these variations be equitably accounted for, and
if so, how? Moreover, how can they be measured and weighed against
the administrability detriments that will certainly result from the
additional complexity required to differentiate among groups? This
question is considered below.
D. Administrability/Equity Tradeoffs
As described above, the reduced tax imposed on extraordinary
dividends under the 2004 tax holiday rule was imposed after those
dividends were run through the income tax base of a taxpaying
corporation.'s A corporate offshore profits transition tax would be
simpler if it were imposed on a measure of offshore, untaxed earnings
without running the tax base through the taxpaying firm's income tax
return. For example, declining to run the transition tax through the
income tax base would avoid presenting corporations with incentives
to use tax planning to lower their income tax rate in the year in which
the COPE transition tax was imposed.
The transition tax would also be simpler if it imposed a flat rate
of tax on offshore earnings without allowance for a foreign tax credit.
The administrability advantage is enhanced because firms have little
reason to keep track of their pre-1987 foreign taxes paid under the
179. See Jennifer Gravelle, Who Will Benefit from a Territorial Tax? Characteristics
of Multinational Firms, Presentation at National Tax Association Annual Meeting (Nov.
16, 2012).
180. See generally Altshuler & Grubert, supra note 134 (describing "excess credit"
firms).
181. See supra notes 163-68 and accompanying text (describing I.R.C. § 965 (2006)).
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relevant deemed dividend rules. Most firms presumably would have
to engage in a forensic accounting exercise in order to determine
these pre-1987 foreign taxes.
Imposing a corporate offshore profits transition tax that did not
vary based on firms' different marginal tax rates and foreign tax
credit positions could have important equitable effects, in particular
with respect to the equitable positions of some groups of
multinational corporations compared to other groups. But these may
be best dealt with in the political process and best mediated by
interest group lobbying.
So long as special interest groups can influence legislation-and
reliable accounts provide every indication that they can,"' at least in
the absence of an unusually strong media firestorm of opposition to
the special interests 184-they can be relied upon to defend themselves
through interest group lobbying.' Tax policymakers might propose a
182. Typically, foreign tax credits relating to income taxes paid by non-U.S. corporate
subsidiaries are available for credit against U.S. income tax only where there is a dividend
distribution from the subsidiary to a U.S. parent corporation. See I.R.C. § 902(a) (2006).
The relationship between the dividend distribution and the total earnings of the non-U.S.
subsidiary determines the proportion of non-U.S. income taxes paid by the non-U.S.
subsidiary that are deemed paid by the U.S. parent upon distribution. See id. However,
these "pooling" rules only apply to post-1986 earnings and taxes. See id. Pre-1987 earnings
and taxes are subject to a different regime. See id. § 902(c)(6); see also BORIS 1. BITFKER
& LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 172.9.3 (3d
ed. 2005) (describing last-in, first-out rule applicable to pre-1987 earnings). If a lower-tier
corporation is the source of the earnings and related creditable foreign taxes, "tiering-up"
rules apply to determine what taxes are brought up between levels as distributions make
their way up the chain. See I.R.C. § 902(b) (2006). Finally, at the U.S. parent level,
basketing rules attempt to prevent cross-crediting, or, for example, the use of higher
income taxes attributable to dividends drawn from active business non-U.S. income to
reduce the U.S. tax due on dividends drawn from lower-taxed passive non-U.S. income.
See id. § 902.
183. See Michael Doran, Legislative Compromise and Tax Transition Policy, 74 U. CHI.
L. REv. 545, 587-89 (2007) (noting that deal brokering over transition policy is
inextricably linked to the steady-state policy and to the chances of overcoming the
legislative status quo bias).
184. See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the
Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 25
(1990) (emphasizing media role in encouraging a turning point toward successful base-
broadening reform in the 1986 Act).
185. This is especially important because of the complexities of corporate firms'
interests. For example, the brief equity discussion here does not consider the possibility
that accounting considerations will significantly affect how firms react to reform proposals.
See, e.g., James M. Poterba, Nirupama S. Rao & Jeri K. Seidman, Deferred Tax Positions
and Incentives for Corporate Behavior Around Corporate Tax Changes, 64 NAT'L TAX J.
27, 50-51 (2011) (noting that a corporate rate reduction results in a decrease in financial
accounting net income for firms with deferred tax assets and an increase in net income for
firms with deferred tax liabilities).
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flat transition tax that does not differentiate among firms with
different effective tax rates or foreign tax credit positions, anticipating
that interest group lobbying will sort out significant inequities.8 6
As an example, assume an energy firm pays high rates of foreign
tax,"' and an internet firm pays low rates of foreign tax.'" Further,
assume a flat-rate transition tax not allowing any reduction for
foreign tax credits, and that the amount of the transition tax exceeds
the present value of the tax that each firm would eventually pay upon
repatriation of untaxed offshore earnings.
The energy firm might object that the tax exceeds that firm's
corresponding estimate of the present value of its future tax on
accumulated offshore earnings, due to foreign tax credits. If there is
sufficient political pressure to remedy this inequity, several tools are
available in the political process to help do so. Possibilities include
income tax benefits available to energy firms, such as oil and gas
depletion allowances.'89
The internet firm in the example might also object that the tax
exceeds the firm's estimate of the present value of the eventual tax on
offshore earnings due to the firm's plan not to repatriate any
substantial earnings. The equities of this situation are somewhat
different. For example, transition tax supporters might point to the
ongoing discussion of transition tax policy in the event of territoriality
adoption, including the Camp proposal, as evidence of the clearly
incorrect nature of an estimate of zero tax on offshore earnings in the
event of such a reform. The equities of the pre-enactment system that
permitted the software firm to accumulate so much cash overseas free
of U.S. tax might be discussed, together with related public relations
and accounting implications. Perhaps a different deal would be
struck.
The above approach of leaving equities to the process of interest
group lobbying pushes complexity away from the transition tax and
into other areas of a reform package. Whether this tradeoff makes
sense depends, in part, on the incremental complexity and cost in the
balance of a legislative package that would result from interest group
186. A caveat relates to the possibility of firms' inability to effectively lobby
individually. If different effective tax rate and foreign tax credit profiles do not break
down along group lines formed for other purposes, the ability of a lobbying process to
resolve inequities may be reduced.
187. See Grubert & Altshuler, supra note 4, at 348 (identifying petroleum firms as
entities with generally high rates of foreign tax).
188. See Grubert, supra note 139, at 259 (explaining that research and development-
based intangibles are correlated with lower foreign tax rates).
189. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 611 (2006) (providing energy-related depletion rules).
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lobbying mounted in objection to any perceived inequity in the flat
and no-foreign-tax-credit nature of the corporate offshore profits
transition tax proposed here. The incremental complexity in turn
depends in part on whether the balance of the reform package is
likely to be complicated in any case. Different effects of territoriality
adoption on different firms suggest that other complexities resulting
from interest group lobbying are indeed likely. Different impacts of
accompanying revenue raisers should similarly result in complexities.
The Camp discussion draft, for example, has a large number of
specialized provisions that would have different impacts on different
corporations."
III. TRANSITION TAX BASE
A. Tax Measure Versus Financial Accounting Measure
There are two potential sources of information that might
support a corporate offshore profits transition tax base. One is a tax
measure: the untaxed offshore earnings and profits of non-U.S.
subsidiaries recorded for U.S. federal income tax purposes,
particularly for the purpose of calculating foreign taxes deemed paid
by a U.S. corporation when it receives a dividend distribution from a
foreign subsidiary. 192 The other is a financial accounting measure: the
unremitted earnings of foreign subsidiaries, including those
designated as PRE, 193 as determined under financial accounting
rules. 194
190. See GRAVELLE, supra note 22, at 25-27 (describing Camp proposal).
191. See Treas. Reg. § 1.964-1 (as amended in 2009) (providing rules for determining
the earnings and profits of a foreign corporation and using a financial accounting profit
and loss statement as a starting point).
192. See Treas. Reg. § 1.902-1(a)(9) (as amended in 2009) (defining "post-1986
undistributed earnings" as earnings and profits).
193. The standard for permitting a firm to avoid recording a deferred tax liability by
categorizing earnings as "permanently reinvested earnings" is known as the "Indefinite
Reversal Exception" and is set forth by FASB ASC 740-30-25-17. See Blouin, Krull &
Robinson, supra note 151, at 2-4.
194. "Unremitted earnings" are one element of the book-tax basis difference of the
stock of non-U.S. subsidiaries owned by U.S. parent corporations. See ABAHOONIE &
ALFONSO, supra note 152, at 6. Some unremitted earnings produce a deferred tax liability.
Others do not because they have been designated under the Indefinite Reversal
Exception. See, e.g., Apple Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 63 (Oct. 26, 2011), available
at http://investor.apple.com/secfiling.cfm?filinglD=1193125-11-282113&CIK=320193
(listing $8.9 billion deferred tax liability resulting from unremitted earnings and a
designation of PRE under the Indefinite Reversal Exception in 2011 resulting in a
decrease in expected tax of $3.9 billion in 2011).
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This Part will discuss efficiency, administrability, and equity tax
base considerations. It will focus first on the tax earnings and profits
measure and then on the financial accounting unremitted earnings
measure. The tax earnings and profits base is the most natural choice
for a transition tax base since it most closely adheres to the
underlying goal of imposing a lump-sum tax intended to match the
eventual income tax that would be due on a firm's untaxed offshore
earnings."1 However, the tax earnings and profits base suffers from at
least two compliance challenges: difficulty of determining pre-1987
earnings and vulnerability to reductions in the earnings and profits
base from tax planning.
These compliance challenges raise efficiency, administrability,
and horizontal equity issues. The deadweight loss of taxpayer
compliance and planning efforts produces the efficiency concern. The
challenge of policing tax planning generates the administrability
concern. A related horizontal equity problem may arise assuming that
taxpayers differ in their exposure to high compliance costs and/or in
their willingness to engage in aggressive tax planning, given the
likelihood that aggressive tax planning will not be discovered and/or
appropriately redressed."' To address each of these issues, the
financial accounting measure of unremitted earnings could be used
both to provide an easier method of calculating the transition tax base
based on pre-1987 earnings and to reduce the impact of tax planning
on the transition tax base.
B. The Tax Measure: Earnings and Profits
Untaxed offshore earnings and profits, as calculated for U.S.
federal income tax purposes, provide one source of information that
could support a corporate offshore profits transition tax base. This tax
measure is typically split into post-1986 undistributed earnings and
pre-1987 accumulated profits.' This is because of an ordering rule
that requires the taxpayers to first use the post-1986 amount and then
the pre-1987 amount to support the calculation of deemed paid
195. See Daniel Shaviro, The Optimal Relationship Between Taxable Income and
Financial Accounting Income: Analysis and a Proposal, 97 GEO. L.J. 423, 430 (2009) ("The
purposes that underlie requiring companies to compute taxable income and financial
accounting income are quite distinct.").
196. Cf Mark P. Gergen, Uncertainty and Tax Enforcement: A Case for Modest Fault-
Based Penalties, 64 TAX L. REV. 453, 472 (2011) (noting different impact of uncertainty
and certain sanction rules on risk-averse versus risk-neutral taxpayers).
197. See Form 1118, Foreign Tax Credit-Corporations (2011), available at http:/
www.irs.gov/publirs-pdflflll8.pdf.
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foreign income taxes brought up when a non-U.S. corporation pays a
dividend to a U.S. corporation. 98
Most firms should have relatively easy access to a post-1986
earnings and profits calculation since they need it to determine the
deemed foreign taxes paid upon the distribution of earnings.
However, there is little reason for most firms to calculate their pre-
1987 foreign earnings and profits. This is because the pre-1987 figure
is needed for deemed foreign tax credit calculations only after the
firm has distributed all of its post-1986 foreign earnings and profits.
Due in part to MNCs' incentive to retain earnings overseas and avoid
the U.S. tax typically due on repatriation,"'9 it is likely that most firms
have found it unnecessary to determine their pre-1987 foreign
earnings and profits.
The earnings and profits figure reflects a deduction for foreign
taxes paid.2 It thus permits taxpayers to reduce their tax as a result
of foreign taxes, though its deduction mechanism is less generous
than a tax credit mechanism, since a deduction reduces taxable
income, rather than tax, on a dollar-for-dollar basis. Permitting a
deduction for foreign taxes rests on the theory of taxable income
measurement: foreign taxes are a legitimate income-
generation expense.20' Some commentators strongly argue in support
198. See I.R.C. § 902(a), (c)(6) (2006) (referring to post-1986 earnings and providing
that dividends shall first be made out of post-1986 earnings and then out of pre-1987
earnings, the latter of which are subject to rules in effect before the 1986 statutory
change).
199. See supra Part II.A.
200. See Treas. Reg. § 1.902-1(a)(9)(iii) (as amended in 2009) (providing for reduction
of earnings and profits for foreign taxes paid "regardless of whether the taxes are
creditable").
201. Another question is whether the transition tax itself should be deductible from
firms' federal income tax base. It should not be. The reason is that the transition tax is
intended to match a federal income tax liability, and federal income taxes are not
deductible against a federal income tax base. See I.R.C. § 164 (2006) (allowing deduction
for listed taxes, not including federal income taxes). Deductibility would be circular. In
other words, a lower rate is possible if the tax is not deductible. However, deductibility
would also provide an "upside-down subsidy" to firms with higher marginal tax rates. See,
e.g., Lily L. Batchelder, Fred T. Goldberg, Jr. & Peter R. Orszag, Efficiency and Tax
Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 24 (2006)
(describing the upside-down subsidy phenomenon under which deductions provide higher
dollar benefits to higher-income taxpayers). There is no reason to think that taxpayers'
expectations about the present value of the eventual tax liability on their offshore untaxed
earnings are negatively correlated with their current marginal tax rate, and, therefore,
there is no equitable reason to impose a lower tax on firms with higher current marginal
tax rates by permitting a deduction for the transition tax.
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of allowing only a deduction, and not a credit, for foreign taxes
paid.202
When a U.S. corporation receives a dividend from a foreign
subsidiary, the U.S. corporation is also deemed to pay a portion of the
foreign income taxes paid by the foreign subsidiary for U.S. foreign
tax credit. Otherwise, the earnings underlying the dividend would be
taxed twice. The amount of foreign income taxes deemed paid along
with a dividend generally equals the dividend multiplied by a fraction,
the numerator of which equals post-1986 foreign income taxes and
the denominator of which equals post-1986 foreign earnings.203 This
has produced an incentive for U.S.-parented MNCs to engage in tax
planning in order to increase the foreign income taxes that are
deemed paid by a U.S. parent when it receives a dividend from a non-
U.S. subsidiary. Reducing post-1986 foreign earnings, the
denominator of the fraction, accomplishes the goal of increasing
foreign taxes deemed paid. Planning strategies include efforts to
maximize tax depreciation deductions in non-U.S. subsidiaries by
stepping up the basis of assets in non-U.S. subsidiaries for U.S.
purposes, but not for non-U.S. purposes.
Additional tax planning strategies might also arise if a corporate
offshore profits transition tax used a tax earnings and profits base. If
firms had an opportunity to plan before the transition tax base
measurement date, they might erode the transition tax base, for
example by recognizing tax losses in their non-U.S. subsidiaries. Even
after the tax base measurement date, they might carry back losses
that would adjust the transition tax base, if the transition tax
legislation did not bar this strategy. Firms might distribute earnings in
advance of the tax base measurement date or even sell subsidiaries
202. See Clausing & Shaviro, supra note 137, at 431-32 (2011) (criticizing foreign tax
creditability as "over-generous" and its underlying "worldwide efficiency criteria" as
lacking "conditionality"); Musgrave, supra note 23, at 178 ("[U]nder what may be called a
'national' view of taxpayer equity the foreign tax is treated as a deduction from foreign
source income (in effect, a cost of doing business), and the residence country's corporate
tax is applied to foreign earnings net of foreign tax.").
203. See 1.R.C. § 902(a) (2006) (providing formula).
204. See, e.g., Harry J. Hicks, III, Selected Section 338 Issues on International
Acquisitions and Dispositions by U.S. Multinationals, in 11 TAx STRATEGIES FOR
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONs, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES, FINANCINGS,
REORGANIZATIONS & RESTRUCTURINGS 2001, at 1295, 1297 (noting that a U.S. buyer of
a firm would be advised to "always consider making a section 338 election" with respect to
the acquisition of a foreign target, in part to increase the basis of the target's assets, thus
increasing future depreciation deductions and decreasing future target earnings in order to
"supercharge" foreign tax credits).
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with high accumulated earnings and replace the subsidiaries with
contract arrangements. 205
The efficiency framework advanced in Part II emphasized the
importance of seeking a transition tax burden that matched
taxpayers' estimate of the present value of future tax on offshore
earnings. The use of a tax earnings and profits base in general tends
to further this efficiency goal. Nevertheless, there are also efficiency
drawbacks to the use of a tax earnings and profits base. First, the lack
of information about pre-1987 earnings and profits requires the
inefficient use of taxpayer resources to perform forensic earnings and
profits studies. Second, a tax base drawn from the tax measure of
earnings and profits incents taxpayers to make inefficient choices,
such as incurring tax planning costs or making business decisions that
would be inadvisable in the absence of the transition tax.206
Both the lack of information about pre-1987 earnings and profits
and the availability of tax planning strategies cause parallel
administrability problems. There is an information asymmetry
problem with respect to the calculation of pre-1987 earnings and
profits: taxpayers will have all the information, and the government
will lack the audit resources necessary to ensure that their
calculations make sense.207 Similarly, tax base erosion strategies may
be challenging to identify, may not provide the government with a
sufficient chance of litigation success and would consume significant
resources to litigate in any case. Finally, different compliance costs
and different tolerance of aggressive tax planning among affected
taxpayers can also present a horizontal equity concern, since more
aggressive taxpayers could obtain a better tax result through
planning.20
205. Cf Julie Roin, Can the Income Tax Be Saved? The Promise and Pitfalls of
Adopting Worldwide Formulary Apportionment, 61 TAX L. REV, 169, 236-37 (2008)
(noting that existing tax law encourages the use of "third party commissionaires and
contractors" and that a formulary apportionment system might encourage the further
expansion of such strategies).
206. See, e.g., Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, The Costs of Taxation and the
Marginal Efficiency Cost of Funds, 43 INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFF PAPERS 172, 172
(1996) (arguing that taxation can cause "deadweight losses-from substitution, evasion
and avoidance activities-and direct, administrative and compliance, costs").
207. Cf. Yariv Brauner, Value in the Eye of the Beholder: The Valuation of Intangibles
for Transfer Pricing Purposes, 28 VA. TAX REV. 79, 121 (2008) (noting that because of a
lack of guidance and administrative controls, the determination of intangibles pricing for
transfer pricing purposes is "completely exposed to abuse by taxpayers and their
advisors").
208. Cf Gergen, supra note 196, at 472 (noting different impact of uncertainty and
certain sanction rules on risk-averse versus risk-neutral taxpayers).
593
594 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91
C. The Financial Accounting Measure: Unremitted Earnings
The financial accounting tax base candidate for a corporate
offshore profits transition tax is the measure of a firm's unremitted
earnings held in non-U.S. subsidiaries. This differs from the PRE
figure that is sometimes cited as an available estimate of offshore
earnings or cash 2" and was used as a benchmark in the 2004
repatriation holiday. 210 A corporate offshore profits transition tax
should seek to reach all unremitted non-U.S. earnings. However,
PRE represents only a portion of unremitted earnings, those for
which the company has represented, and its auditors have accepted,
that "repatriation will be . . .postponed indefinitely."21 1 A widely
cited estimate of total PRE is $1.3 trillion.2 12
Imposing a tax on a financial accounting measure of unremitted
earnings has administrability and efficiency advantages. A tax base
linked to earnings recorded for financial accounting purposes avoids
the information problems and tax planning costs that otherwise
209. See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Overseas Cash and the Tax Games Multinationals Play,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Oct. 3, 2012, 1:48 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/10/03/overseas-cash-and-the-tax-games-multinationals-
play/ (referencing PRE as a measure of cash held overseas).
210. Section 965 of the Internal Revenue Code used PRE as a benchmark when it
provided that the amount of tax-favored dividends could not exceed "the amount shown
on the applicable financial statement as earnings permanently reinvested outside the
United States." I.R.C. § 965(b) (2006) (providing for a reparation amount limit of the
greater of $500 million or PRE).
211. Julie H. Collins, John R. M. Hand & Douglas A. Shackelford, Valuing
Deferral: The Effect of Permanently Reinvested Foreign Earnings on Stock Prices, in
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION AND MULTINATIONAL ACTIvITY 143, 143-44 (James R.
Hines Jr. ed., 2001). This rule is presently defined in FASB ASC-740. See Ernst & Young
LLP, Portfolio Description Sheet, Accounting for Income Taxes-FASB ASC 740, Tax &
Acet. Center (BNA),
http://taxandaccounting.bna.com/btac/lpages/lpages.adp?pg=acctports (last visited Jan. 4,
2013) (subscription required) ("Accounting Standards Codification Topic 740 (ASC 740)
codifies the guidance related to accounting for income taxes that was previously included
in ... APB 23."). The financial statement incentive for the identification of PRE is that the
deferred tax liability that would result on the payment of dividends to the U.S. need not be
recognized for accounting purposes. See ABAHOONIE & ALFONSO, supra note 152, at 1.
Accordingly, PRE tends to be higher when offshore earnings would incur a significant tax
upon repatriation, for example, because the earnings had been subject to low non-U.S.
income taxes before repatriation or because the earnings would be subject to high non-
U.S. withholding taxes upon repatriation. See Blouin, Krull & Robinson, supra note 151,
at 20 & n.27, 35 (reporting results suggesting that 95% of PRE is located in affiliates with
tax due upon repatriation, including withholding tax, and 74% of PRE is located in lower-
tax affiliates). Other factors can, however, also prompt PRE designations, including
earnings management, see Krull, supra note 143, at 746, 765, and practical linkages
between PRE designations for low-tax affiliates and PRE designations for higher-tax
affiliates. See Blouin, Krull & Robinson, supra note 151, at 12-13.
212. See ZION, VARSHNEY & BURNAP, supra note 1, at 1.
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present efficiency, administrability, and horizontal equity problems.
This is because the measure of unremitted earnings provides a third-
party-verified figure which companies generally have been incented
to maximize rather than minimize.213 The use of a financial accounting
measure of unremitted earnings as a transition tax base would permit
the calculation of the corporate offshore profits transition tax based
on a firm's most recent financial statements and/or supporting
working papers. Later adjustments to transition tax liability would be
based solely on financial accounting restatements.
However, using a financial accounting measure of unremitted
earnings would also pose efficiency costs because it would be
inconsistent with taxpayers' expectations and might influence
taxpayers to anticipate other instances of conformity. Conformity
does not attract a consensus. This is in part because the accounting
rules push against "overstatement of income," while the tax rules
push against "understatement of income," and both goals cannot
always be pursued simultaneously. 214 For example, accounting rules
might aim to ensure that firms recognize losses for accounting
purposes, while tax laws might aim to ensure that firms recognize
gains for tax purposes.215
In addition, tax accounting is more open to government politics
than financial accounting, since decisions are made by Congress
rather than by an independent standards board.216 Tax accounting
must answer to fiscal and policy goals, while financial accounting
focuses on information accuracy and disclosure. For example, tax
typically uses a faster rate of depreciation than accounting.' The
substitution of a financial accounting base would disturb the tax base
equilibrium, and if that equilibrium contributes to equity, changing
213. See Shaviro, supra note 195, at 429 (noting the possibility of "[s]etting the goals of
reducing and increasing 'income' against each other"); see also Gil B. Manzon, Jr. &
George A. Plesko, The Relation Between Financial and Tax Reporting Measures of
Income, 55 TAX L. REV. 175, 181-82 (2002) ("[T]he incentives of preparers likely differ
with respect to financial reporting and tax reporting. Specifically, managers of firms may
have incentives to make choices that increase income reported to shareholders while at
the same time making choices that minimize reported taxable income."); Wolfgang Schon,
The Odd Couple: A Common Future for Financial and Tax Accounting?, 58 TAX L. REV.
111, 119-22, 145 (2005) (discussing financial and tax accounting in the United States).
214. See, e.g., Manzon & Plesko, supra note 213, at 181-82 (noting different incentives
and objectives in tax and financial accounting).
215. See Shaviro, supra note 195, at 446.
216. See id at 465-72 (comparing political environments relating to the setting of tax
accounting and financial accounting rules).
217. See, e.g., Manzon & Plesko, supra note 213, at 181 (noting different depreciation
approaches).
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the base reduces equity. A reference in the 2004 tax holiday law to
PRE as a limit on the maximum amount that could be repatriated 2 18
was a relatively rare instance of the explicit use of financial
accounting figures in tax statutes.
The equity issue most directly raised by the tax base question is
deciding the relative winners and losers among the global
multinationals expected to pay a corporate offshore profits transition
tax."' Stated differently, compared to the tax base of earnings and
profits, how would an unremitted earnings financial accounting
measure for the tax base of a transition tax change the treatment of
different MNCs relative to each other? A full consideration of this
question is beyond the scope of this Article. However, diverse results
should be expected. For example, one important component of book-
tax differences derives from temporary differences such as those
relating to depreciation schedules;22 0 these will be more important for
firms with significant capital investment. Another component of
book-tax differences results from the use of employee stock options
as compensatory devices;2 1 this, too, should differ from firm to firm.
There might be an equity reason to use the narrower measure of
PRE, rather than the broader measure of unremitted earnings, as a
tax base if firms' PRE bore a predictable relationship to earnings and
profits across firms depending on the extent to which unremitted
earnings bore foreign taxes. For example, assume that high-taxed
non-U.S. earnings were never designated PRE and low-taxed non-
U.S. earnings were always designated PRE. If this were so, applying a
corporate offshore profits transition tax to a PRE base might be a
good proxy for imposing the transition tax only to the extent that
firms would not be able to claim a foreign tax credit to reduce U.S.
tax due on the underlying income.
It appears, however, that firms' PRE does not bear a predictable
relationship to the financial accounting measure of total unremitted
earnings, let alone the tax measure of earnings and profits. Jennifer
Blouin, Linda Krull, and Leslie Robinson report that about 75% of
218. I.R.C. § 965(b) (2006).
219. This is the third of three equity concerns raised above in Part II.C, identifying: (1)
the question of the equitable role of the corporate tax in general; (2) the question of
relative winners and losers in the event of a revenue-neutral business tax reform effort;
and (3) the question of relative winners and losers among the global multinationals who
would be expected to pay the transition tax.
220. See SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 118, at 186 (noting tax and financial accounting
tension relating to "income shifting across time").
221. See Manzon & Plesko, supra note 213, at 190-92 (describing impact of
nonstatutory stock options on tax accounting and financial accounting).
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the PRE they study is located in affiliates with corporate tax rates less
than or equal to 30%, but only about 20% is located in the so-called
"big 7" tax havens.2 22 The largest percentages of PRE are located in
relatively high-tax trading partners, with between 11% and 17% in
each of the UK, Canada, and Germany.2m Ratios of PRE to assets
vary significantly by sector.224 In addition, firms may have different
policies for designating PRE, consistent with the hypothesis that
investors may value PRE differently depending on how the PRE are
invested 225 and also consistent with findings of significant diversity in
earnings management practices more generally.2 6 Some, for example,
may set aside all they can out of a pool of low-taxed foreign earnings;
others will set aside far less than they perhaps could. Apple is an
example of a company that sets aside a fairly low proportion of its
non-U.S. earnings as PRE.2 27
D. How the Financial Accounting Measure of Unremitted Earnings
Can Backstop the Tax Measure of Earnings and Profits
As described above, using a financial accounting measure like
unremitted earnings as a tax base might violate taxpayer expectations,
cause taxpayers to anticipate greater conformity between financial
accounting and tax accounting on other items in the future, and
disturb whatever equity is currently built into the use of income tax
accounting in order to measure tax liability. However, using a
financial accounting measure also provides some efficiency and
222. See Blouin, Krull & Robinson, supra note 151, at 18 n.25, 19, 35.
223. See id. at 42.
224. "Wholesale trade" companies, for example, which include intermediaries for the
sale of goods, have PRE on average equal to between 25 and 30% of assets and their total
PRE represents about 20% of the total. Id. at 43. Electronic manufacturers have PRE on
average equal to about 15% of assets and their total PRE represents less than 10% of the
total. Of course, these figures depend in part on the denominator of "assets"; perhaps
wholesale trade concerns have lower capital needs than electronic manufacturers. See id.
at 43.
225. See Bryant-Kutcher, Eiler & Guenther, supra note 132, at 701 (describing results
indicating that PRE attract lower valuations if invested in financial assets).
226. See, e.g., Poterba, Rao & Seidman, supra note 185, at 50-51 (reporting significant
diversity in firms' reporting of deferred tax assets and deferred tax liabilities).
227. Apple apparently does not designate large portions of its unremitted earnings that
it could designate as PRE. See Peter Svensson, How Apple's Phantom Taxes Hide Billions
in Profit, USA TODAY, Jul. 23, 2012, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/story/2012-07-
23/apple-phantom-taxes/56441134/1; see also Daniel Shaviro, Is Apple Deliberately
Understating Its Earnings?, START MAKING SENSE BLOG (Jul. 24, 2012), http://
danshaviro.blogspot.com/2012/07/deliberately-understating-earnings.html (discussing the
idea that Apple is "lobbying for the enactment of an exemption system that ... would give
them a positive reported earnings shock of many billions of dollars, in addition to giving
them full U.S. access to the overseas fund without a tax hit").
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administrability benefits. In particular, unremitted earnings might
help address the efficiency, administrability, and horizontal equity
problems posed by unknown pre-1987 earnings and by tax planning
opportunities to erode an earnings and profits transition tax base.228
Financial accounting incentives already discourage at least one
approach to planning to reduce a corporate offshore profits transition
tax because they deter repatriation in at least some circumstances. 229
In particular, a firm's repatriation of earnings previously designated
as PRE requires a firm to change the designation of the earnings, thus
reneging on previous representations regarding intended repatriation
plans.23 0 Work on repatriation in response to the 2004 holiday shows
that financial accounting disincentives appear to have discouraged
repatriation in some cases.231
More explicit use of the financial accounting measure of
unremitted earnings to backstop the tax measure of earnings and
profits is also possible. For example, the corporate offshore profits
transition tax could include a provision that required or permitted
companies to use their pre-1987 financial accounting unremitted
earnings as a measure of their pre-1987 earnings and profits. This
could be styled as an election, as a required data point in the
determination of pre-1987 earnings and profits, or as a required
disclosure. There are benefits and detriments to the different
approaches to such a reference to unremitted earnings. 2
The corporate offshore profits transition tax could also require
reconciliation between a company's financial accounting measure of
unremitted earnings and its tax measure of earnings and profits. Such
reconciliation would resemble the existing Schedule M-3 (to C
corporations' income tax return filed on Form 1120), which requires
large corporate taxpayers to reconcile their book and tax income.233
228. See supra Part II.B (describing tax base erosion planning opportunities).
229. See generally Jennifer Blouin, Linda Krull & Leslie Robinson, Is U.S.
Multinational Dividend Repatriation Policy Influenced By Reporting Incentives?, 87 ACCT.
REV. 1463 (2012).
230. See id. at 1467, 1487.
231. See id. at 1487.
232. See, e.g., Heather M. Field, Choosing Tax: Explicit Elections as an Element of
Design in the Federal Income Tax System, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 21 (2010) (discussing
advantages and disadvantages of providing taxpayers with explicit elections).
233. Schedule M-3 (Form 1120), Net Income (Loss) Reconciliation for Corporations
with Total Assets of $10 Million or More, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/
fll2Osm3.pdf; see also Shaviro, supra note 195, at 477-79 (describing how to "[t]ake
advantage of Schedule M-3 in designing the taxable income adjustment").
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As with Schedule M-3, significant discrepancies might trigger more
careful audit examination.234
A final possibility is to provide for the transition tax to tax
unremitted earnings to the extent the difference between the
accounting measure and the tax measure exceeded a certain level.
The objections to book-tax base conformity described above may be
less pressing in the case of the corporate offshore profits transition
tax, as it would only require one-time, snapshot conformity, which
seems less likely to cause alarm among accounting standard-setters as
a result of the different politics and objectives of tax income
measurement. However, a full analysis of this option is beyond the
scope of this Article.
IV. A TRANSITION TAX FOR AN ACCOMPANYING WORLDWIDE
CONSOLIDATION REFORM
Most of this Article considers the appropriate form for a
corporate offshore profits transition tax in connection with a steady-
state territorial tax reform. Although a steady-state worldwide
consolidation reform is not the focus of current political debate, it is a
possibility. 235 Worldwide consolidation would involve the current
taxation of all income earned by non-U.S. subsidiaries of U.S. parent
corporations. 236 It could tax non-U.S. business income at the
maximum U.S. statutory rate or at a lower rate. 237 This Part briefly
applies the efficiency and equity elements of this Article's framework
to transition tax policy in connection with a worldwide consolidation
steady-state reform.
A. Efficiency
As the discussion of efficiency in Part II initially noted, one view
suggests that an efficient transition tax policy should give retroactive
234. See Shaviro, supra note 195, at 477 ("To date, the main purpose served by
Schedule M-3 has been to provide the IRS with a vital roadmap for tax audits, by helping
to identify the most potentially questionable areas on corporate tax returns.").
235. See, e.g., The Bipartisan Tax Fairness and Simplification Act of 2011, S. 727, 112th
Cong. § 2 (2011) (sponsored by Senators Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) and Dan Coats (R-Ind.))
(proposing deferral repeal and the reduction of the corporate rate to 24%); WHITE
HOUSE & DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 7, at 1-15 (proposing a "minimum" rate
of tax on non-U.S. income).
236. See, e.g., Kleinbard, supra note 28, at 152 (describing a "worldwide global tax
consolidation (or 'full inclusion') model").
237. See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 3, at 417 (proposing "serious consideration" of a low
but nonzero rate of tax on non-U.S. income).
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effect to the accompanying steady-state reform."23 If the
accompanying reform were worldwide consolidation, this would
support a transition tax at the worldwide consolidation rate. For
example, if the worldwide consolidation policy were accompanied by
a reduction in the corporate tax rate to 24%239 and allowed a foreign
tax credit, the transition tax policy might seek to impose a burden on
untaxed accumulated offshore earnings equal to the burden that
would have been imposed if such earnings had been taxed on a flow-
through basis at 24%, subject to a foreign tax credit, all along.24 0 If the
worldwide consolidation policy provided for the taxation of non-U.S.
business income at 10%, with a deduction rather than a credit for
foreign taxes, then the appropriate transition tax might tax untaxed
accumulated offshore earnings at a rate of 10% to mimic the burden
on such earnings that would have been imposed if such earnings had
been taxed on a flow-through basis at a rate of 10% with a foreign tax
deduction rule in effect all along.2 4 1
Since steady-state policy is not routinely made retroactive,2 42
taxpayers would not expect such an approach. Rather, the idea of
making steady-state policy retroactive aspires to prompt taxpayers to
anticipate policy change, both on a prospective and retroactive
basis.2 43 If taxpayers changed their behavior based on anticipating
retroactive policy change as well as prospective policy change, the
change would have more far-reaching impact on taxpayer behavior.2"
If the policy changes are good, encouraging taxpayers to anticipate
the changes may constitute wise policy.245 Ben Alarie has defended
the retroactive application of the Canadian general anti-avoidance
rule, or GAAR, on this ground.246
238. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text (outlining argument for retroactive
transition tax policy particularly in the case of good policy changes).
239. See, e.g., S. 727, § 2 (proposing deferral repeal and the reduction of the corporate
rate to 24%).
240. For administrability and constitutional reasons, such a tax might be structured as a
lump-sum, flat rate tax rather than, for example, requiring the reopening of tax years
and/or the calculation of foreign tax credits. See supra Part II.B (discussing similar issues).
241. See supra notes 123-27 (describing a "new view" of dividend taxation).
242. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
243. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 92, at 14 ("Sometimes efficiency in the present
setting requires ... that a reform be made explicitly retroactive.").
244. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
245. See SHAVIRO, supra note 85, at 48-49 (explaining why retroactive rule change
may be good if the policy change is good).
246. See Benjamin Alarie, Retroactivity and the General Anti-Avoidance Rule, in TAX
AVOIDANCE IN CANADA AFTER CANADA TRUSTCO AND MATTHEW 197, 215-17 (David
G. Duff & Harry Erlichman eds., 2007) (noting rule-of-law as well as efficiency-based
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Even if taxpayers could, in the future, be prompted to form such
expectations and act on them, there is little reason to think that
taxpayers would expect the retroactive application of a worldwide
consolidation reform since existing congressional practice does not
include such retroactive transition rules.247 Accordingly, the
retroactive application of a worldwide consolidation approach would
not necessarily match taxpayer expectations.2 48 For each of these
reasons, the imposition of transition tax in connection with a
worldwide consolidation reform could surprise taxpayers and cause
them to take actions such as increasing use of expatriation strategies
to avoid being subject to future unexpected changes in U.S. tax
rules.249 As this Article has assumed elsewhere, Congress presumably
wants to avoid the risk of such a taxpayer surprise.
However, a worldwide consolidation reform without any
transition tax, like a territoriality reform without any transition tax,
would provide a windfall to U.S.-parented MNCs. This is because
such MNCs should currently expect to bear some future U.S. income
tax burden with respect to their untaxed accumulated offshore
earnings. Thus, the efficiency analysis outlined above in Part II.A
replicates in the worldwide consolidation context, and the goal of
matching taxpayer expectations should similarly support a transition
tax of 5-10% on such earnings.25 0
There is one circumstance in which the theory suggesting that
transition tax policy should match steady-state policy and the theory
stating that transition tax burdens should match taxpayer
expectations produce similar transition tax results. This circumstance
involves the enactment of a worldwide consolidation regime that
imposes a 5-10% tax burden on non-U.S. business income going
forward and permits only a deduction, not a credit, for foreign
taxes. 1 In that case, the idea of matching transition tax policy to
steady state policy would also produce the result of a 5-10%
transition tax on a tax base of earnings and profits.
arguments against retroactivity and arguing that one could "reasonably expect" a
retroactively applied GAAR to substantially reduce tax abuse).
247. See supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 86-88.
249. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
250. See supra Part II.A (linking taxpayer expectations with tax rate recommendation).
251. See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 3, at 417 (proposing "serious consideration" of a low
but nonzero rate of tax on non-U.S. income).
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B. Equity
In this Article, consideration of equity issues has mentioned the
question of the role of the corporate tax generally in vertical equity
terms; the question of equity among three categories of business
firms, global multinationals, domestic corporations, and
unincorporated businesses; and equitable relationships among
different global multinationals.25 2 The prospect of worldwide
consolidation squarely raises the second equity issue. This is because
it raises the prospect that global multinationals will be losers, and
domestic corporations will be winners, under a worldwide
consolidation reform. For example, if the effective rate of tax on non-
U.S. income is about 16% for a particular U.S.-parented MNC,53
then worldwide consolidation at a higher rate would increase the tax
liability of that MNC.
This tax rate differential matters because of both its effect on
taxes paid on future income24 and its impact on asset valuation. So
long as lower rates were available to competitors, for example, under
territorial systems, the differential would depress the value of such
non-U.S. investments in the hands of U.S. firms.255 As a result, U.S.
firms might sell some assets and simply bear the value decline of
other investments.26
Implicit taxation analysis provides the key to understanding this
"for sale sign" concern. The idea that after-tax returns adjust to a
single equilibrium rate drives implicit taxation. A tax that applies to a
certain type of asset initially decreases the asset type's after-tax
return, but under the assumption that after-tax returns converge, the
price of the taxed asset will decrease until the asset produces the
equilibrium after-tax return .2 ' Table 2 illustrates the predicted
implicit taxation result of the decline in value in non-U.S. assets
252. See supra text accompanying note 55.
253. Cf Grubert, supra note 139, at 281 (reporting average effective foreign tax rate of
16% for U.S. multinational companies in 2004).
254. Revenue estimates for deferral repeal are fairly modest, as low as $13 billion per
year. See Gravelle, Practical Tax Reform, supra note 174, at 402 (giving an annual revenue
estimate of $12.9 billion annually); see also GREGG & WYDEN, supra note 171, at 3
(estimating revenue increase resulting from both imposing per-country foreign tax credit
rules and including active income in taxable subpart F income at approximately $60 billion
annually).
255. See supra text accompanying note 55.
256. See Shaviro, supra note 3, at 394 (describing clientele effects that could produce
"asset swaps" between U.S. and non-U.S. investors upon the imposition of a worldwide
tax).
257. See SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 118, at 130-31 (defining implicit taxes and their
impact on asset prices).
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owned by U.S.-parented MNCs upon adoption of worldwide
consolidation. The assumed after-tax rate of return is 10%.
Table 2: Implicit Taxation Results for Non-U.S. Assets







Non-U.S. asset valued at 1000
if held by U.S. MNC with: 119 89
ex ante rate = 16%
ex post rate = 25%
Non-U.S. asset valued at 1000
if held by non-U.S. MNC with 119 95 95
tax rate of 20%
This implicit tax result, together with the burden of paying
additional tax on future non-U.S. income, is likely to cause global
U.S. multinationals to object to the imposition of a transition tax on
offshore earnings in connection with a worldwide consolidation
reform. In contrast, if global corporations will fare better in the future
under a territoriality reform, they may be more inclined to accept a
corporate offshore profits transition tax. If a reform is adopted that
falls in between territoriality and worldwide consolidation, for
example, by imposing a non-zero, but non-maximum, rate of tax,258
then an analysis of whether global multinationals are "winners" or
"losers," including under this sort of implicit taxation analysis, should
suggest whether they should bear the burden of the transition tax
from an inter-business equity and related political lobbying
perspective.
CONCLUSION
What transition tax should be imposed on the $1 trillion to $2
trillion of pre-enactment non-U.S. earnings of U.S.-parented
multinational firms if the United States eliminates its current
258. See WHITE HOUSE & DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 7, at 14-15 ("The
President proposes. .. establishing a new minimum tax on foreign earnings.").
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approach of residual taxation upon repatriation of earnings from non-
U.S. corporate subsidiaries to U.S. parent corporations? This could
happen under a territorial reform plan, a worldwide consolidation
reform plan, or an intermediate option. This Article has used the
traditional tax policy metrics of efficiency, administrability, and
equity to propose a design for such a corporate offshore profits
transition tax. The proposed corporate offshore profits transition tax
would equal between 5-10% of the untaxed earnings and profits of
non-U.S. subsidiaries, with no reduction to account for foreign tax
credits and some use of the financial accounting measure of
unremitted earnings to reduce compliance and administrative costs.
With respect to the appropriate tax rate, efficiency concerns
support a transition tax that matches taxpayer expectations. A
transition tax that is less burdensome than taxpayers expect would
cause a windfall. A transition tax that is more burdensome than
taxpayers expect might produce post-enactment efforts by taxpayers
to plan for or avoid future transition taxes or other unexpected taxes,
including corporate taxpayers' possible increased use of expatriation
strategies. This Article assumes that legislators would prefer to
capture a windfall and also avoid presenting corporate taxpayers with
incentives to minimize their exposure to future explicitly retroactive
changes in U.S. tax law.
Expectations formed simply by discussions about transition taxes
might suggest a transition tax rate in the range of 0-10.5%, while
expectations formed by estimates of the present value of the eventual
burden of taxation on pre-enactment offshore earnings, based on
assumptions outlined above, suggest a tax of about 10%. This Article
argues that foreign tax credits should not be allowed to offset
transition tax liability because such an allowance would significantly
reduce the administrability of the tax and increase its compliance
costs. Equity problems, and in particular inequities among different
global multinationals, may arise as a result of failing to account for
foreign tax credits. But adequately represented corporate interests
can address such inequities through the political process, including
through adjustments to other provisions included in a reform
package.
With respect to the appropriate tax base, this Article identifies
two contenders: the tax measure of earnings and profits and the
financial accounting measure of unremitted earnings. The earnings
and profits tax measure is more consistent with taxpayer expectations
and with equitable determinations incorporated into tax accounting
rules. However, it has efficiency and administrability disadvantages
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stemming from the difficulty of determining pre-1987 earnings and
profits and the likely ability of taxpayers to plan to erode the earnings
and profits tax base. The financial accounting measure of unremitted
earnings may better support a pre-1987 earnings calculation and is
less susceptible to tax planning. Financial accounting earnings
measures might be used to backstop or check an earnings and profits
tax base, including through the use of pre-1987 unremitted earnings
as a proxy for pre-1987 earnings and profits and by requiring
taxpayers to disclose a reconciliation of differences between
unremitted earnings calculated under financial accounting rules and
accumulated earnings and profits calculated under tax rules.
